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FUTURE-PROOFING ENERGY TRANSPORT LAW 
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. energy system is critical to every aspect of the nation’s 
economy and daily life. That energy system, in turn, is completely dependent 
on U.S. energy transport infrastructure—the oil pipelines, natural gas 
pipelines, electric transmission lines, and import and export facilities that 
transport and distribute the energy resources that power the country. This 
Article explores how the law can influence the billions of dollars in private 
sector energy transport investments necessary to meet current energy needs 
as well as respond to the significant technological, market, and policy 
developments in the energy sector. In doing so, it develops criteria 
policymakers should consider in creating laws and regulations to govern 
energy transport infrastructure that focus on federalism principles, 
flexibility in the location and amount of energy resources, and clean energy 
goals. It then applies these criteria to two of the nation’s most pressing 
energy transport debates: (1) whether to transfer more siting authority for 
interstate electric transmission lines from the states to a federal or regional 
authority and (2) whether to transport new sources of North American oil 
primarily by an upgraded rail system or by expanded pipeline 
infrastructure.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. energy system is critical to every aspect of the nation’s 
economy and daily life. That energy system, in turn, is completely 
dependent on U.S. energy transport infrastructure—the oil pipelines, natural 
gas pipelines, electric transmission lines, and import and export facilities 
that allow for the transportation and distribution of the energy resources that 
power the country. This Article explores how the law can best influence the 
billions of dollars in private sector energy transport investments necessary 
to meet current energy needs, address the rapid technological and market 
shifts in the energy sector, and implement present and future clean energy 
goals. In other words, it considers how policymakers can attempt to “future-
proof”1 energy transport laws to deliver the growing array of present and 
future fossil fuel and renewable energy resources to markets and consumers 
in a sustainable manner. 
In a time of major technological and economic change in the energy 
sector, it is difficult to decide what to build. Should electric utilities and 
other market actors pour billions of dollars into expanding the long-distance 
electric transmission grid to transport wind energy in the Midwest to 
population centers on the coasts if new industrial scale batteries or new wind 
turbine technology will ultimately make such long-distance infrastructure 
unnecessary?2 Should the oil industry build new major interstate oil 
pipelines if expansion of existing interstate rail infrastructure can fill a short 
term need to transport increased oil production while avoiding the path-
dependency that comes with new pipeline infrastructure devoted to 
transporting fossil fuels for another generation?3 Should the private sector 
 
 
 1. “Future-proofing is the process of anticipating the future and developing methods of 
minimizing the negative effects while taking advantage of the positive effects of shocks and stresses due 
to future events. Future-proofing is a term that is used across the globe in multiple cultures and multiple 
industries.” See Principles of Future-proofing: Research on Future-proofing the Built Environment, 
http://principlesoffutureproofing.com. See also Future Proof, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com 
/definition/2204/future-proof (“Future proof is a buzzword that describes a product, service or 
technological system that will not need to be significantly updated as technology advances.”). 
 2. See Diane Cardwell, Tesla Ventures Into Solar Power Storage for Home and Business, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1DGek0B; Diane Cardwell, Wind Power is Poised to Spread to All 
States, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1JxUPii (discussing a DOE report on the ability of 
taller wind turbines to bring increased wind capacity to all fifty states); Jeff McMahon, Did Tesla Just 
Kill Nuclear Power?, FORBES (May 1, 2015), http://onforb.es/1Iv7nWU. 
 3. See James Conca, Pick Your Poison for Crude—Pipeline, Rail, Truck or Boat, FORBES (Apr. 
26, 2014), http://onforb.es/1lSYIQS; Charles Esser, Rail vs. Pipelines: How to Move Oil, INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, May 2, 2014; Elizabeth Douglass, In Keystone Fight and Beyond, Infrastructure Is Energy 
Policy, INSIDE CLIMATENEWS (Jan. 8, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/ 20150108/keystone-
fight-and-beyond-infrastructure-energy-policy (reporting that major energy infrastructure projects, like 
interstate pipelines, have a lifespan of thirty years or more and thus “infrastructure is destiny.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
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expand the natural gas pipelines network to allow electric utilities to more 
easily replace coal-fired electricity with cleaner-burning and now cheap 
natural gas? Or should it focus more heavily on investing in the 
infrastructure necessary to move directly to a greater reliance on utility-
scale wind, solar, and hydropower energy and expand locally distributed 
energy in the form of increased rooftop solar coupled with battery storage?  
Legal structures that help or hinder the development of energy transport 
infrastructure influence the answers to these questions. This is particularly 
true because this infrastructure spans multiple local, state, and federal 
jurisdictions and is regulated by a combination of local, state, and federal 
actors.4 Moreover, it is almost exclusively the private sector that builds and 
owns the billions of dollars in infrastructure necessary to transport fuels and 
electric energy resources across the country from import and domestic 
production sites to nationwide markets and exports.5 This stands in stark 
contrast to the U.S. road transportation infrastructure, which is planned, 
developed, and built almost exclusively by government actors.6 Because 
energy transport infrastructure will last for many decades, decisions made 
now regarding what to build will profoundly influence the capital-intensive 
private investments in a wide range of fossil fuel and renewable energy 
resources long into the future.7 In other words, “infrastructure is destiny.”8  
A holistic evaluation of current and developing energy transport systems 
and the laws that govern them is critical to a clean energy future. This is 
because energy transport infrastructure requires significant utilization of 
land-based and other physical resources to build millions of miles of 
pipelines and electric transmission lines, thousands or millions of charging 
or fueling stations, and the like. This infrastructure can become completely 
 
 
 4. QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW, TRANSFORMING U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN A TIME 
OF RAPID CHANGE: THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW S-3 (2015) 
[hereinafter QER]. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See, e.g., About, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., FED. HWY. ADMIN., www.fhwa.dot.gov/about. 
 7. See, e.g., William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 
1624 (2014) (“[T]he $1.1 trillion invested in the current electric power system in the United States, 
combined with the multi-decade lifetimes of many of these assets, and a constellation of deeply 
entrenched political and economic interests, makes the system very resistant to change.”). 
 8. Douglass, supra note 3. See also N. Jonathan Peress, How to Ensure New Natural Gas 
Infrastructure Doesn’t Lock Out Renewables, FORBES (June 5, 2015), http://onforb.es/1G08JqK (noting 
that the typical lifespan of a natural gas pipeline is fifty years or more, that they are financed over decades 
based on long-term contracts, and that “[b]y locking in that demand . . . these massive investments lock 
out competition from cleaner, more efficient alternatives.”); Boyd, supra note 7, at 1624–25 (observing 
that the U.S. electric power system is “very resistant to change” and that “the investment decisions made 
today will strongly influence the industry’s [greenhouse gas] emissions profile for decades to come.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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obsolete at best and a public health or environmental risk at worst if 
changing markets and technology leave it behind.9 But it becomes very 
difficult to abandon such major investments in favor of new sources of 
energy even if technology and market development would otherwise 
support such a transition.10 This raises the question of what types of laws 
can most effectively require or encourage the build-out of energy transport 
infrastructure that can meet the needs of the present but also incorporate the 
changing technologies, markets, and clean energy policies of the future. 
Policymakers, industry, and the public must make major efforts to future-
proof energy transport laws to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate 
changing energy development technologies and resources while attempting 
to achieve clean energy goals in a process that adequately weighs both 
national energy needs and local costs of energy infrastructure.  
An assessment of existing energy transport laws also raises important 
federalism questions because federal law governs some forms of energy 
transport infrastructure—like interstate natural gas pipelines—and state law 
governs other forms of energy transport infrastructure—like interstate oil 
pipelines and interstate electric transmission lines.11 Such distinctions 
profoundly impact private investment decisions not only in energy transport 
infrastructure, but also in the energy resources themselves, which are 
profitable only if they can be cost-effectively delivered to processing and 
distribution sites and markets.  
These concerns about sunk costs, path dependency, federalism, future-
proofing, and a clean energy future are coming to a head as the nation faces 
growing concerns regarding climate change at the same time as it has an 
unprecedented abundance of newly available sources of domestic oil, 
natural gas, wind, and solar energy. After decades of concern about growing 
U.S. oil imports and the high cost of natural gas, developments in hydraulic 
fracturing and directional drilling technologies have made massive new 
domestic sources of oil and gas available in Texas, Oklahoma, 
 
 
 9. The tension in energy law between sunk investments and new technology is longstanding. See, 
e.g., Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945) (The “due process clause never 
has been held by this Court to require a commission to fix rates on the present reproduction value of 
something no one would presently want to reproduce, or on the historical valuation of a property whose 
history and current financial statements showed the value no longer to exist, or on an investment after it 
has vanished, even if once prudently made, or to maintain the credit of a concern whose securities already 
are impaired.”). 
 10. Douglass supra note 3. See also MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD., INTERAGENCY REPORT ON OIL 
PIPELINES 48–49 (Dec. 2015) (“Development of infrastructure to support the extraction, transportation, 
refinement, and combustion of oil has the potential to release additional carbon into the atmosphere and 
may perpetuate a carbon-based economic structure that contributes to climate change.”). 
 11. See infra Parts I & II. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
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Pennsylvania, Ohio, and North Dakota.12 This has resulted in a significant 
decline in oil imports that will continue for decades, and will result in the 
U.S. transitioning from a net importer of natural gas in 2013 to a net exporter 
as early as 2018.13 This shift has also resulted in a precipitous drop in natural 
gas prices, allowing gas to displace coal as a major source of electric energy, 
as well as a significant drop in oil prices, which has a major effect on the 
vehicle and transportation sector.14 With regard to renewable energy, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”)15 predicts that electricity 
generation from renewable sources such as wind and solar energy will 
increase dramatically.16 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
estimates that wind power alone could supply 20% of U.S. electricity needs 
by 2020 and 35% by 2050, and such percentages already exist in certain 
regions of the country.17  
These new energy resources can either put the United States on a path to 
a greater dependence on fossil fuels, which are now available domestically 
at low prices, or can help the nation transition to a clean energy economy, 
with new sources of wind and solar energy on a scale very few would have 
anticipated less than a decade ago. Which path predominates depends in 
large part on what energy transport infrastructure the private sector invests 
in to deliver the growing array of fossil fuels and renewable energy 
 
 
 12. Although hydraulic fracturing technology has been available for decades, it was not a 
technologically feasible or cost effective method to extract oil and gas from shale until the industry 
developed new directional drilling technologies (the ability to drill long, horizontal wells) and improved 
3D seismic imaging techniques. See Mason Inman, Natural Gas: The Fracking Fallacy, 516 NATURE 
28, 29 (2014). See also John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas As 
a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 964–74 (2015) (discussing developments in 
hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling technologies and the role of government policy and support 
in those developments). 
 13. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2050 (2017) [hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK]; Jenny Mandel, 2017 Will Bring Fundamental Gas Market 
Shift, EIA Says, ENERGYWIRE, July l3, 2016; Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Expected to Drive Growth 
in U.S. Natural Gas Trade, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Feb. 22, 2017. 
 14. See infra Parts I.A. and I.B. 
 15. The EIA is the statistical and analytical agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. 
According to its website:  
[The] EIA collects, analyzes, and disseminates independent and impartial energy information 
to promote sound policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding of energy and its 
interaction with the economy and the environment. . . . [B]y law, its data, analyses, and forecasts 
are independent of approval by any other officer or employee of the U.S. government.  
See About EIA: Mission and Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/about/mission_ 
overview.cfm.  
 16. ENERGY OUTLOOK at 13, 69–80. 
 17. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, WIND VISION: A NEW ERA OF WIND POWER IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4 (2015) [hereinafter WIND VISION]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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resources to processing facilities and consumers. And legal frameworks 
governing energy transport siting have a major influence on these 
investment decisions. This is particularly true because this new abundance 
of domestic energy resources comes at a time when there is increasing 
public resistance by landowners, environmental advocates, and others to the 
expansion of new energy transport infrastructure like the Keystone XL and 
Dakota Access oil pipelines as well as new natural gas pipelines and 
interstate electric transmission lines.18 In the face of major public opposition 
to new energy transport infrastructure, the role of the law in facilitating or 
blocking the ability to obtain siting permits and exercise eminent domain 
authority to build such transport infrastructure cannot be overstated.  
Part I evaluates the rapidly changing nature of the U.S. energy economy 
as well as the development, current status, and key challenges of the U.S. 
energy transportation network of oil pipelines, natural gas pipelines, electric 
transmission lines, and related energy import and export facilities. It 
describes these multi-billion dollar physical networks, their current 
shortcomings, and their future promises and challenges. These promises and 
challenges include the development of new utility-scale battery technology 
to store electric energy, the shift from building natural gas import terminals 
to building natural gas export terminals in a span of less than ten years, the 
growth of oil transport by rail, and the increasing human health and safety 
risks associated with oil transport in general. Part I also introduces the 
federalism tensions in the various siting and eminent domain laws 
governing the infrastructure necessary to transport oil, gas, and electric 
energy. 
Part II analyzes in greater detail a select group of federal and state laws 
that regulate the planning, permitting, and construction of energy transport 
infrastructure. It considers the federal laws governing the siting and eminent 
domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas import 
and export terminals, as well as state laws governing the siting and eminent 
domain for interstate electric transmission lines. This analysis illustrates 
how federal siting authority is used to overcome state opposition to energy 
transport infrastructure when that infrastructure may meet national or 
regional energy needs but imposes costs on local economies, environmental 
values, and property rights. It also illustrates how states can create nearly 
insurmountable regulatory roadblocks to approving interstate energy 
transport projects that would facilitate the transition to a clean energy future 
 
 
 18. See infra Parts I.A., II.A.2, & II.B.1.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
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(such as interstate electric transmission lines) and other projects (like oil 
pipelines) that would do precisely the opposite.  
Finally, Part III draws on the examples in Part II to set forth criteria 
policymakers should consider in creating laws and regulations to best 
encourage development of clean energy resources and the infrastructure 
necessary to transport them. Part III proposes that laws governing energy 
transport infrastructure can best adapt to changing technologies and markets 
when they: (1) give siting and eminent domain authority to federal or 
regional regulators when the energy transport infrastructure will physically 
cross state boundaries; (2) allow for flexibility regarding the location and 
amount of expected domestic energy resources to transport, import, or 
export; and (3) support state and federal clean energy goals. Part III also 
recognizes that these goals may be in conflict with each other in some cases 
and discusses some of the trade-offs between them. 
Part III then uses two illustrations to apply these criteria. It first considers 
the benefits and costs associated with transferring primary siting and 
eminent domain authority for interstate electric transmission lines from the 
states to a federal or regional permitting authority. It concludes that for 
interstate electric transmission lines that physically cross state lines, a 
regional or national permitting authority is preferable to state permitting 
authority, at least until technology develops sufficiently to allow for 
alternatives to long-distance transmission lines for large-scale carbon-free 
electricity transport and use. This Part then evaluates whether to transport 
new sources of North American oil primarily by an upgraded rail system or 
by expanded pipeline infrastructure. It concludes, perhaps surprisingly, that 
the criteria developed in this Part would support relying more heavily on an 
upgraded rail system to transport new sources of oil instead of investing 
billions of dollars in new interstate oil pipelines that would lock in fossil 
fuel investments for decades. 
I. ENERGY TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE PAST AND FUTURE 
In its inaugural Quadrennial Energy Review in 2015, the U.S. DOE 
focused on the massive scale and scope of U.S. energy transport 
infrastructure: 
It includes approximately 2.6 million miles of interstate and intrastate 
pipelines; 414 natural gas storage facilities; 330 ports handling crude 
petroleum and refined petroleum products; and more than 140,000 
miles of railways that handle crude petroleum, refined petroleum 
products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal. The electrical 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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component of the Nation’s TS&D [transmission, storage, and 
distribution] infrastructure links more than 19,000 individual 
generators with a capacity of 1 megawatt or more (sited at more than 
7,000 operational power plants), with more than 642,000 miles of 
high-voltage transmission lines and 6.3 million miles of distribution 
lines.19  
A major theme throughout the report is the need to build and improve energy 
transport infrastructure in a time of rapid technological and economic 
change in the energy sector. And this challenge is exacerbated by the 
following facts—much of this infrastructure is owned and operated by 
multiple, fragmented private sector actors with “natural monopoly” 
characteristics20 that favor incumbent providers; it spans numerous local, 
state, and federal jurisdictions; and it is variously regulated by a 
combination of local, state, and federal actors.21 
This Part first discusses changes in how the U.S. transports its growing 
domestic oil resources. It then turns to natural gas transport infrastructure, 
focusing on interstate natural gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas 
(“LNG”) import and export terminals. Last, it explores the nation’s 
electricity transport system and highlights recent efforts to expand the 
electric grid to integrate growing renewable electric energy resources as 
well as take advantage of newly available low-cost natural gas. 
A.  Transporting Oil: Pipelines and Rail 
A combination of pipelines, water carriers, trucks, and railroads 
transport oil and other petroleum products throughout the United States. 
Traditionally, pipelines and oil tankers have carried approximately 90% of 
 
 
 19. See QER, supra note 4, at 1-2. In his “Climate Action Plan” released in 2013, President Obama 
directed his Administration to begin an interagency Quadrennial Energy Review, with annual 
installments over four years, to match federal energy policy with the nation’s economic and climate 
goals “in this dramatically changing energy landscape.” Id. at S-2. 
 20. Electric utilities, natural gas utilities, and other companies that provide essential services to the 
public are often regulated as “natural monopolies.” For these types of businesses, infrastructure 
investments (transmission lines, pipelines, etc.) are very costly and it is often economically inefficient 
for multiple companies to make these infrastructure investments to compete for customers. Instead, in 
these situations it is more efficient for only one company to build and operate the necessary infrastructure 
to provide the essential service rather than having numerous companies build redundant infrastructure. 
Under the “regulatory compact” that applies to these industries, companies acting as natural monopolies 
avoid having to compete for customers with other companies in exchange for state or local regulation of 
their prices, customer relationships, and investment decisions, in order promote the public interest. 
ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENERGY LAW (CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS) 165–67 
(Foundation Press 2017).  
 21. QER, supra note 4, at S-3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
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crude oil to refineries where it is converted to refined petroleum products 
and then shipped by pipeline, rail, truck, or barge to markets.22 According 
to the DOE, “[t]here are more than 180,000 miles of liquid petroleum 
pipelines in the United States, delivering over 14 billion barrels annually of 
crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas liquids [(“NGLs”)],23 each 
through their own dedicated pipeline network.”24  
These pipelines are critical to the U.S. transportation sector because 
domestically and throughout the world, petroleum (gasoline, diesel, and jet 
fuel) makes up 90% of transportation fuels, with natural gas providing only 
3%, biofuels 4%, and other sources (including electricity, liquid petroleum 
gas, and other fuels) 3%.25 In light of the continuing dominant role of oil in 
the transportation sector, it is hard to overstate the importance of 
technological developments in hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling 
in the first decade of the 21st century for U.S. oil and gas production. After 
many decades of concern over the nation’s growing dependence on foreign 
nations for oil and natural gas imports, in 2015 the U.S. became the world’s 
largest combined producer of petroleum and natural gas.26 As a result, the 
 
 
 22. See Memorandum from Quadrennial Energy Review Task Force Secretariat & Energy Policy 
& Sys. Analysis Staff to Members of the Pub. 3, 3 n.4 (May 21, 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum]; 
Natural Gas Pipelines, PIPELINE 101, http://www.pipeline101.org/why-do-we-need-pipelines/other-
means-of-transport (stating that pipelines carry 71% of crude oil and petroleum products on a ton-mile 
basis, oil tankers and barges carry 22%, trucks carry 4%, and rail carries 3%); STEVEN LEVINE, ET AL., 
THE BRATTLE GROUP, UNDERSTANDING CRUDE OIL AND PRODUCT MARKETS 10, fig. 11 (2014), 
http://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/crude-oil-product-markets/crude-oil-primer/ 
understanding-crude-oil-and-product-markets-primer-high.pdf. 
 23. “Natural gas liquids (NGLs) are hydrocarbons . . . composed exclusively of carbon and 
hydrogen,” and include ethane, propane, butane, isobutane, and pentane. “NGLs are used as inputs for 
petrochemical plants, burned for space heat and cooking, and blended into vehicle fuel.” See U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., What are Natural Gas Liquids and How Are They Used?, TODAY IN ENERGY 
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5930. Pipelines that transport NGLs 
are sited and permitted like oil pipelines on a state-by-state level rather than like interstate natural gas 
pipelines, which are sited and permitted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See, e.g., David 
L. Wochner, FERC’s Jurisdiction Now Reaches Ethane Pipelines Too, LAW 360, Feb. 27, 2014 
(explaining that federal jurisdiction over NGL pipelines is under the Interstate Commerce Act, not the 
Natural Gas Act, and extends to rates and conditions of service but not to the siting, construction, 
abandonment, or transfer of facilities); PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST, PIPELINE BRIEFING PAPER #14: 
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO PIPELINES 3–4 (2015) (discussing pipeline siting issues); infra 
notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing state level disputes over oil and NGL pipeline siting 
and eminent domain). 
 24. Memorandum, supra note 22, at 3 (footnotes omitted). Refined petroleum products include 
multiple grades of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, heating oil, propane and butane. Id. There are far fewer miles 
of oil and refined petroleum pipelines than there are natural gas transmission lines (approximately 
300,000 miles) and natural gas distribution lines (approximately 2.1 million miles). Id. at 4.  
 25. Energy Use for Transportation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/EnergyExpla 
ined/?page=us_ energy_transportation. 
 26. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., United States Remains Largest Producer of Petroleum and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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U.S. is now less dependent on foreign oil than it has been in forty years, has 
increased its exports of refined petroleum products significantly, and is 
poised to become a net exporter of natural gas by 2018.27 
This massive increase in oil and gas production as a result of directional 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing in the late 2000s was unexpected.28 It 
created immediate challenges for the existing oil and gas transport 
infrastructure by greatly expanding U.S. production and by enabling 
production in parts of the country that had not been significant producing 
regions for decades, if ever. For instance, North Dakota’s production of oil 
from the Bakken shale region increased from 81,000 barrels per day in 2003 
to more than 1 million barrels per day by 2014, turning it into the number 
two oil-producing state in the nation behind Texas.29  
With the rapid increase in shale oil development, pipeline companies are 
engaged in the largest U.S. oil pipeline build-out since World War II, with 
significant new oil pipelines under development to transport unconventional 
oil resources from Alberta, Canada; North Dakota; and Texas.30 These 
pipelines include the controversial Keystone XL and Dakota Access 
pipelines, which, between the two of them, are designed to transport oil 
sands (also referred to as “tar sands”) from Alberta, as well as shale oil from 
the Bakken region of North Dakota, to refineries in the Gulf Coast and 
elsewhere.31 Although much of the controversy over both pipelines focused 
on federal approvals—a State Department Presidential Permit in the case of 
Keystone XL for the U.S.-Canada border crossing and a U.S. Army Corps 
 
 
Natural Gas Hydrocarbons, TODAY IN ENERGY (May 23, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/deta 
il.cfm?id= 26352#. 
 27. See Increasing Domestic Production of Crude Oil Reduces Net Petroleum Imports, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Apr. 21, 2015 (discussing reductions in U.S. oil imports); supra note 13. 
 28. For background on hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling technologies, data on increased 
production of oil and natural gas from shale and tight oil formations, and the location of shale plays, see 
generally, AM. PETROLEUM INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: UNLOCKING AMERICA’S NATURAL GAS 
RESOURCES (2015); James McBride & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 10, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/energy-and-environment/hydrau 
lic-fracturing-fracking/p31559; MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43148, AN OVERVIEW OF UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND FEDERAL 
ACTIONS (2015).  
 29. See Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 31, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dn 
av/pet/pet_ crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_m.htm (showing crude oil production by state).  
 30. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure 
Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 969–71 (2015) (discussing scale and scope of recent oil pipeline 
expansions and highlighting the Keystone XL pipeline from Canada to the Gulf Coast and the Sandpiper 
Pipe from North Dakota to Minnesota). 
 31. Robinson Meyer, Donald Trump and the Order of the Pipelines, The Atlantic (Jan. 25, 2017); 
Darran Simon & Eliott C. McLaughlin, Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines: How Did We Get Here?, 
CNN (Jan. 25, 2017). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
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of Engineers permit to cross under a federally controlled reservoir in the 
case of Dakota Access—the vast majority of interstate oil pipelines require 
only state approvals. This is because states, not the federal government, 
have primary jurisdiction over siting and eminent domain for interstate oil 
pipelines.32 Many states require an oil pipeline to obtain a certificate of need 
(sometimes called a certificate of public convenience and necessity) to build 
the pipeline, and define such pipelines as a “public use,” granting them the 
right to exercise eminent domain authority.33 Thus, with regard to Keystone 
XL, even though it has now received a Presidential Permit from the Trump 
Administration, it must still obtain approval from Nebraska, where litigation 
is ongoing regarding state approval.34 
The publicity over the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines 
coupled with the fact that state law rather than federal law governs approvals 
of all oil pipelines not on federal lands have created a fairly effective 
groundswell of opposition to such pipelines. Throughout the country, 
landowners have joined forces with environmental and climate change 
advocates to mount effective, state-based opposition to such pipelines at a 
scale not seen in the past. In Minnesota, Kentucky, and Georgia, for 
example, residents and environmental groups have opposed oil and NGL 
pipelines,35 arguing that the development of new pipeline infrastructure 
contributes directly to climate change and facilitates increased use of fossil 
fuels; that the pipeline’s potential adverse impacts on water, wetlands, and 
other natural resources outweigh any benefits of the pipeline; that an out-
of-state or foreign corporation should not be able to exercise eminent 
domain authority to take private property for a pipeline; and that there is no 
in-state benefit from the pipeline because all the oil producers and oil 
 
 
 32. Meyer, supra note 31; Simon & McLaughlin, supra note 31; Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 
30, at 981–89; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Corps Grants Easement to Dakota Access LLC (Feb. 8, 
2017), http://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/Media/News-Releases/Article/1077134/corps-grants-easement 
-to-dakota-access-llc/. 
 33. States generally define oil pipelines as a public use by statute, along with electric transmission 
lines, water lines, natural gas pipelines, and other similar infrastructure. See Klass & Meinhart, supra 
note 30, at 983, app. (detailing state statutes and different approaches states take with regard to defining 
oil pipelines as a public use for purposes of eminent domain authority). 
 34. See Brady Dennis & Steve Mufson, As Trump Administration Grants Approval for Keystone 
XL Pipeline, An Old Fight is Reignited, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2017; Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 30, 
at 975–79, 982–88. The state approval process for interstate oil pipelines stands in contrast with the 
federal approval process for interstate natural gas pipelines. See infra Part I.B. 
 35. As noted earlier, NGL pipelines are not within FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate natural gas 
pipelines and are sited and approved at the state level like oil pipelines. For a description of NGLs, see 
supra note 23. 
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markets are in other states.36 Even when these challenges do not succeed, 
they inevitably cause delay and increase costs associated with new oil 
pipeline infrastructure.37 
As the controversies continue over building new oil pipelines to meet 
growing domestic production, oil transport by rail has increased 
dramatically. Oil transport by rail increased from 4,674 rail cars in 2006 to 
493,000 rail cars in 2014.38 This is true even though shipping crude oil by 
rail costs $5-$10 more per barrel than shipping it by pipeline.39 At least 
while oil prices remained high, producers were more than willing to bear 
the additional costs on both a short-term and a long-term basis because: (1) 
constraints on existing pipeline infrastructure in the Bakken shale region in 
North Dakota left no other short-term alternatives; (2) rail is established 
infrastructure and using it to transport oil requires only the construction of 
easily built loading and unloading facilities; (3) rail infrastructure already 
serves every refinery in the country; and (4) rail facilities can be built more 
quickly than pipelines, allow greater flexibility for shippers, and require 
fewer capital risks.40 Rail has transported as much as 75% of the oil 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., Liz Sawyer, Pipeline Protests Draw Marchers to St. Paul, STAR TRIB., June 7, 2015 
(discussing opposition to Sandpiper Pipeline based on the climate change impacts of Canadian oil sands 
development); David Shaffer, Minnesota PUC Approves Enbridge’s Sandpiper Pipeline but Didn’t 
Settle Its Route, STAR TRIB., June 6, 2015 (discussing the approval process for Sandpiper Pipeline in 
Minnesota and opposition based on environmental impacts to the headwaters of the Mississippi River); 
Pam Wright, Kentucky Court of Appeals Upholds Eminent Domain Decision on Pipeline, CENTRAL 
KENTUCKY NEWS, May 22, 2015 (reporting on the 2015 Kentucky Court of Appeals decision holding 
that Kinder Morgan may not exercise eminent domain authority to build the Bluegrass Pipeline to 
transport NGLs through Kentucky because it provides no benefit to Kentucky consumers); Greg 
Bluestein, Palmetto Pipeline Likely Headed to Courts After Georgia Rejects Proposal, AJC.COM (May 
19, 2015) (reporting on decision by Georgia Department of Transportation to deny approval for Kinder 
Morgan’s 360-mile Palmetto Pipeline to transport petroleum products from Florida to South Carolina 
through Georgia because fuel demand in the state did not require new pipeline capacity and thus the 
pipeline would not constitute a public convenience or necessity). 
 37. Some of the recent protests and lawsuits have been successful. The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held in 2015 that the state agency did not do sufficient environmental review of the Sandpiper 
Pipeline and remanded the case for additional review. Enbridge later abandoned the project, at least until 
oil markets rebound. See In re N.D. Pipeline Co., LLC, 869 N.W.2d 693, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015). 
See also Mike Hughlett, Enbridge Energy Pulling Plug on Sandpiper Pipeline, STAR TRIB., Sept. 2, 
2016. In 2016, Georgia and South Carolina enacted moratoria on the use of eminent domain for oil 
pipelines as a result of growing opposition to the Palmetto Pipeline. Molly Samuel, Gov. Nathan Deal 
Signs Pipeline Moratorium Bill, WABE (May 4, 2016), http://news.wabe.org/post/gov-nathan-deal-
signs-pipeline-moratorium-bill; Shelley Robbins, What You Need to Know About Pipelines, 
GREENVILLE J. (June 17, 2016), http://greenvillejournal.com/2016/ 06/17/need-know-pipelines/. 
 38. Memorandum, supra note 22, at 5; QER, supra note 4, at 5-4. 
 39. Shipping a barrel of oil by rail costs between $10 and $15 per barrel as compared to $5 per 
barrel by pipeline. Memorandum, supra note 22, at 3. 
 40. Memorandum, supra note 22, at 5. See also Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 30, at 973–94 
(discussing benefits of oil transport by rail for producers despite the additional costs); Richard Allan & 
Zachary Kearns, Federal Agencies and States Pursue New Regulations for Oil Trains, Face Court 
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produced in the Bakken region, although that number may decrease as more 
new pipelines come on line.41 While the drop in oil prices in the second half 
of 2014 caused some experts to question whether transporting oil by rail is 
a price-competitive substitute for pipelines over the longer term, the fact 
remains that rail will remain a dominant means of oil transport in regions of 
the country not well served by existing pipeline infrastructure.42  
It is also significant that federal law rather than state law governs 
virtually all aspects of railroad routes, prices, construction, and safety, 
which means opponents to the transport of oil by rail have virtually no 
recourse at the state or local government level other than to encourage state 
and local governments to improve spill response procedures.43 While this 
allows a more streamlined process for rail expansion efforts for oil transport 
as well as national uniformity in safety measures, it has also caused concern 
in many communities. This is particularly true after high-profile oil-by-rail 
disasters that have resulted in deaths and extensive property damage, like 
the explosions in Lac Megantic, Quebec; Casselton, North Dakota; and 
 
 
Challenges, MARTEN LAW (Apr. 8, 2015) (discussing reasons for rise in transport of oil by rail, 
particularly from the Bakken shale region); Crude by Rail Provides the West Coast with Supply as 
Regional Crude Oil Production Falls, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., June 9, 2015 (reporting on continued 
long-term decline in California-produced oil, the need to import oil to the region, the lack of major crude 
oil pipelines to the West Coast, and the consequential increased reliance on rail to transport oil to the 
region); JOHN FRITTELLI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43390, U.S. RAIL TRANSPORTATION OF 
CRUDE OIL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5–6 (2014) (discussing flexibility of rail as 
compared to pipelines for transporting oil and why this flexibility can be particularly attractive for a 
market in flux). 
 41. Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 30, at 972–93; AP, North Dakota Oil Shipments by Rail Drop 
Below 50 Percent, FIN. & COM., Aug. 14, 2015 (stating that oil shipments by rail in North Dakota 
accounted for 47% of the 1.2 million barrels of oil produced in June 2015, down from a high of 75% in 
2013, as a result of recently completed pipelines and new refining capacity in the state). 
 42. See FRITTELLI ET AL., supra note 40, at 4–5 (discussing changing economics of transporting 
Bakken crude oil by rail due to potential reduction in pipeline bottlenecks if new pipeline capacity is 
constructed and due to the drop in global oil prices in 2014). But see Mike Lee, N.D. Hits Near-Record 
Oil Production as Prices Plummet, ENERGYWIRE, Aug. 17, 2015 (reporting that North Dakota produced 
1.21 million barrels of oil per day in June 2015, the second-highest monthly average on record, despite 
earlier predictions that low oil prices would prompt producers in the state to reduce production). 
 43. See, e.g., FRITTELLI ET AL., supra note 40, at 14–24 (discussing federal regulation of railroad 
routes, safety, and tank cars); Elizabeth Douglass, 2 States Beef Up Oil-by-Rail and Pipeline Safety After 
String of Accidents, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS, June 16, 2014 (discussing increases in state funding for 
spill response efforts in Minnesota and New Hampshire and additional fees on railroads and pipeline 
companies to pay for them); Richard Allan & Zachary Kearns, Federal Agencies and States Pursue New 
Regulations for Oil Trains, Face Court Challenges, MARTEN LAW (Apr. 8, 2015) (discussing reasons 
for rise in transporting crude oil by rail, state efforts to regulate rail safety, and legal challenges to those 
efforts on federal preemption grounds); Hunton & Williams LLP, North Dakota Crude “Oil 
Conditioning” Order: Vulnerable to Preemption Challenge?, PIPELINELAW.COM (Jan. 13, 2015) 
(discussing whether North Dakota order requiring oil to be “conditioned” prior to shipment by rail to 
reduce volatility is preempted by federal law). 
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other areas of the United States and Canada.44 The increase in shipping oil 
by rail has also caused significant delays in shipments of other commodities, 
such as grain, as well as delays on passenger rail routes, as a result of 
increased congestion on the nation’s railways.45 
B. Transporting Natural Gas: Pipelines and LNG Import/Export 
Facilities 
With regard to U.S. natural gas infrastructure, as of 2014 there were over 
480,000 producing wells, 516 processing plants, 210 pipeline systems 
consisting of over 300,000 miles of transmission pipelines, 414 
underground storage facilities, eleven LNG import terminals (many of 
which are in the process of being converted to export terminals), three LNG 
export terminals, and several more LNG export terminals which have 
received federal approvals and are in the construction process.46 These 
numbers do not include the 200,000 miles of gathering pipelines that collect 
gas from production areas and transport it to processing facilities for 
refining, where it is then delivered to transmission pipelines, and the over 
two million miles of distribution pipelines that deliver natural gas to 
industrial, commercial, and residential customers for heating and, 
increasingly, for electricity generation.47 
Natural gas prices in the United States have always been volatile.48 
Starting in 2008, however, with the growing domestic production of shale 
gas, prices began to drop significantly.49 According to the Congressional 
 
 
 44. See FRITTELLI ET AL., supra note 40, at 10–12 (discussing pipeline spills and oil train 
derailments). 
 45. See, e.g., QER, supra note 4, at 5-8 (discussing increased stress placed on rail transport system 
by increased shipments of oil and adverse effects on grain industry); ELAINE KUB, AM. FARM BUREAU 
FED’N, INSUFFICIENT FREIGHT: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON THE GRAIN INDUSTRY (2015) (white paper commissioned by farm bureau concluding that 
new pipelines are best means to reduce current congestion impacts on grain industry); Angel Gonzales, 
Oil Trains Crowd out Grain Shipments to NW Ports, SEATTLE TIMES (July 26, 2014), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/oiltrainscrowdoutgrainshipmentstonwports/; Ron Nixon, Grain 
Piles Up, Waiting for a Ride, As Trains Move North Dakota Oil, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1qHXSHh; Ron Nixon, As Trains Move Oil Bonanza, Delays Mount for Other Goods and 
Passengers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1y990Fw.  
 46. See QER, supra note 4, app. B, at NG-13, tbl. B-2, NG-22–NG-23, NG-26, tbl. B-6, fig. B-16. 
 47. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-221, PIPELINE PERMITTING: INTERSTATE 
AND INTRASTATE NATURAL GAS PERMITTING PROCESSES INCLUDE MULTIPLE STEPS, AND TIME 
FRAMES VARY 4 (2013); PIPELINE 101, supra note 22. 
 48. From 1995 to 1999, the spot price of natural gas averaged $2.23 per million British thermal 
units (“MMBtu”) but increased to an average price of $4.68 per MMBtu during the 2000–2004 period, 
hitting a peak in December 2005 at $15.38 per MMBtu. RATNER & TIEMANN, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
 49. Natural gas prices remained between $2 and $5 per MMBtu between 2009 and 2015 and 
hovered between $2 and $3 per MMBtu in 2015. Id. See also MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
2017] FUTURE-PROOFING ENERGY TRANSPORT LAW 841 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget Office, by 2040, in the absence of shale gas, U.S. natural gas prices 
would be 70% higher than today’s projected prices for that year.50 Not 
surprisingly, before the widespread implementation of hydraulic fracturing 
technologies, natural gas was used more sparingly in the electricity sector 
because of this historic price volatility. This resulted in greater reliance on 
coal for electricity generation in many parts of the nation despite the 
increased greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and other air pollutants 
associated with its use. For example, in 1990, coal provided 55% of net 
electricity generation and natural gas provided only 12%.51 But by 2013, net 
electricity generation from coal had dropped to 39% and natural gas had 
increased to 27%, with natural gas plants making up over 50% of new 
utility-scale generating capacity.52 In April 2015, natural gas surpassed coal 
as the dominant energy source of electricity in the U.S., providing 31% of 
U.S. electric power generation as compared to 30% for coal, and that trend 
continued into 2016.53  
In addition to lower prices, the EPA’s “Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units” (known as the Clean Power Plan) coupled with existing EPA 
regulations limiting mercury and other emissions from electric power plants 
will likely continue to shift electric energy generation away from coal in 
favor of natural gas.54 Regardless of the fate of the Clean Power Plan, which 
 
 
RESEARCH SERV., R42074, U.S. NATURAL GAS EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN 
OUTCOMES 3–5 (2015) (showing changes in U.S. natural gas production and price over time); Henry 
Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/h 
ist/rngwhhdm.htm. 
 50. See QER, supra note 4, at 1-6. 
 51. See Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting 
Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1932–33 (2015) (discussing historical trends in energy 
sources for U.S. electricity generation). 
 52. Id.; ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., RAILROADS AND COAL 4 (2016) (discussing increases in natural gas 
use for electricity in the 2010s and decreases in coal use for electricity and providing historical charts); 
QER, supra note 4, app. B, at NG-9. 
 53. See Gas Surges Beyond Coal in U.S. Electricity Generation in Historic April Shift, 
CLIMATEWIRE, July 15, 2015; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Natural Gas Expected to Surpass Coal in 
Mix of Fuel Used for U.S. Power Generation in 2016, TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.eia.gov/ todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25392; AP, Coal Production Falls to Lowest Volume 
in 3 Decades, N.Y. TIMES: BUS. BRIEFING (Jan. 8, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1UDphKS; Seth Feaster, IEEFA 
Data Bite: Wind on the Rise, Coal on the Wane, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (May 12, 
2016), http://ieefa.org/ieefa-data-bite-wind-rise-coal-wane/; Tom Murphy, AP, Fuel of Choice: Natural 
Gas Surpasses Coal as Top Source of Electrical Power, July 13, 2015. 
 54. Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012); Q&A: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from Existing Power Plants, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2e 
s.org/federal/executive/epa/q-a-regulation-greenhouse-gases-existing-power. Section 111 provides that 
the standards must limit emissions to the extent “achievable through the application of the best system 
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the U.S. Supreme Court stayed in February 2016,55 the full suite of new 
EPA pollution control regulations governing the electric power sector 
coupled with the economic factors described above favoring natural gas 
over coal will continue to shift additional electricity generation away from 
coal and toward natural gas-fired electricity. 
This significant increase in both natural gas supply and demand has 
resulted in a corresponding expansion in the natural gas pipeline network 
since the late 2000s. Indeed, a technical report the DOE prepared in 
connection with the Quadrennial Energy Review in 2015 concluded that 
increased demand for natural gas for electricity use in connection with new 
clean energy policies would not require significant additional expansion of 
the U.S. natural gas pipeline network except perhaps in New England, 
where pipeline constraints can create shortages in winter months as well as 
price spikes.56 The DOE based this conclusion on the diverse geography of 
current natural gas production and consumption, available capacity on the 
existing pipeline network, and the fact that the industry has already made 
significant expansions in the pipeline network to accommodate increased 
shale gas production since the late 2000s.57 EIA estimates that between 2004 
and 2013, the industry spent over $50 billion expanding the network.58 The 
natural gas industry also benefits from the fact that the pre-existing pipeline 
network is widespread, the pipelines were designed to be long-lived assets 
sized to accommodate additional capacity, and many pipelines were built in 
 
 
of emission reduction.” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
 55. North Dakota v. E.P.A, 136 S. Ct. 999 (Feb. 9, 2016) (mem.). In March 2017, President Trump 
issued an Executive Order directing the EPA to take steps to review, suspend, revise, or repeal the Clean 
Power Plan. See PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROMOTING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (Mar. 28, 2017). 
 56. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED 
DEMAND FROM THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR vi–vii (2015) [hereinafter NATURAL GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS]; QER, supra note 4, app. B, at NG-29–NG-32 (discussing existing 
pipeline capacity in regions of the country and highlighting constraints in New England); Bruce 
Gellerman, Old System, New Solution?: Liquefied Natural Gas Could Be Pipeline Alternative, WBUR 
NEWS, Mar. 11, 2015 (suggesting that importing LNG is a better solution for New England’s heating 
and electricity needs than an expanded pipeline system because constraints exist only on the coldest days 
thus there is no need to build a billion dollar solution “for a 365-day problem when there’s only a 30- to 
40-day problem.”); Cassandra Sweet, In New England, Shale Gas is Hard to Get, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 
2015 (discussing how pipeline constraints are causing generation facilities to rely on more expensive 
LNG imports from Trinidad and Tobago and the Middle East to generate gas-fired electricity in New 
England). But see Mike Lee et al., The Shale-Bust Recovery May Be Coming This Time—Slowly, 
ENERGYWIRE, Apr. 23, 2015 (reporting that “the gas is in the wrong place” in that the Marcellus and 
Utica shales in the northeast are producing so much gas that producers are having to sell it for $1 less 
than producers get in Texas and Louisiana because of regional transport constraints). 
 57. NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS, supra note 56, at vi–vii; QER, supra note 4, 
app. B, at NG-29–NG-32. 
 58. QER, supra note 4, app. B, at NG-28–NG-29. 
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cold weather regions to meet winter heating demand, not electricity needs, 
and thus have additional capacity during off-peak seasons.59  
Moreover, the report highlights the fact that the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has primary jurisdiction over the 
approval of interstate natural gas pipelines, which makes such pipelines 
easier to build than if they were subject to multiple state approvals.60 
Specifically, FERC authorizes such pipelines by issuing a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity if the pipeline meets statutory 
requirements.61 If FERC issues a certificate, the pipeline can exercise 
eminent domain authority to obtain the land necessary to build the pipeline 
if it is unable to negotiate voluntary easements with all landowners.62 Since 
2005, FERC also has primary authority over the approval and siting of LNG 
import and export facilities, generally preempting state law, although states 
may exercise federal rights under other applicable environmental laws such 
as the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean 
Water Act.63 Responding to producer requests to expand the U.S. natural 
gas export market, FERC has approved several LNG terminals for natural 
gas export since 2012.64 
This federal regulatory authority—coupled with the creation of 
expedited permitting processes and Congressional authorization for LNG 
terminals to sign long-term contracts with users65—means that interstate 
natural gas pipelines and LNG facilities can often be built more easily than 
other forms of energy transport infrastructure, such as interstate oil pipelines 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. See also NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS, supra note 56, at vi–vii, 4. 
 61. Under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, FERC determines whether a proposed pipeline meets 
the “public convenience and necessity” and, although it coordinates with state and federal environmental 
agencies in pipeline review, it possesses the ultimate power of approval, which is accompanied by the 
right of the certificate holder to exercise eminent domain. See 15 U.S.C. §717f (2012). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See infra Part II. 
 64. OilOnline Press, EIA: LNG Export Terminals Under Construction, More Planned, OILONLINE 
PRESS (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.oilonline.com/news/midstream/eia-lng-export-terminals-under- 
construction-more-planned; North American LNG Import/Export Terminals Approved, FERC, OFFICE 
OF ENERGY PROJECTS (last visited June 7, 2017) [hereinafter Office of Energy Projects], http://www.ferc 
.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-approved.pdf [perma.cc/ Y7EA-TXPV]. Although applicants must 
obtain approval from FERC to obtain a siting permit to construct the facility, they must also obtain 
approval from DOE to export the natural gas. See, e.g., RATNER, ET AL., supra note 49, at 7–10 
(discussing federal approvals required for LNG export and the status of LNG export applications and 
approvals); Liquefaction Project Details, CAMERON LNG, http://cameronlng.com/pdf/11337%20Camer 
onFctShts_ LiquefactionProject.pdf (discussing FERC and DOE approvals). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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or interstate electric transmission lines.66 Between 2000 and 2011, pipeline 
companies applied for and received FERC approval for more than 16,000 
miles of interstate gas pipelines and nearly 15,000 miles of those pipelines 
were constructed and put in service by 2011.67 Moreover, the transmission 
capacity that was added to the U.S. natural gas pipeline network more than 
doubled from 2007 to 2008.68  
C. Transporting Electricity: The Future of the Grid 
The North American electric transmission and distribution grid consists 
of 7,000 power plants connected to nearly 450,000 miles of high-voltage 
transmission lines, substations, and approximately 6 million low-voltage 
distribution lines.69 The grid is an $876 billion asset managed by over 3,000 
electric utilities serving nearly 300 million residential, commercial, and 
industrial customers.70 In many parts of the nation, non-profit Regional 
Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) and Independent System Operators 
(“ISOs”)71 manage the grid and wholesale electricity markets, even though 
investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities, electric cooperatives, and other 
transmission line owners continue to develop, build, and own the 
transmission assets themselves.72 
After a decline in investment in the transmission system investments for 
decades, investor-owned utilities and other electricity infrastructure owners 
began to invest in the grid in earnest in the early 2000s, and spent $16.9 
billion on transmission in 2013 and $20.1 billion in 2015, up from $5.8 
billion in 2001.73 Construction of new lines accounts for slightly more than 
half of total investments.74 Experts contend that despite these short-term 
increases, greater long-term investment in the transmission grid is necessary 
 
 
 66. See infra Parts I.C and II.B for a discussion of the siting and eminent domain process for 
interstate electric transmission lines. 
 67. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 47, at 12. 
 68. PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43138, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS 
PIPELINES: PROCESS AND TIMING OF FERC PERMIT APPLICATION REVIEW 8 & fig. 2 (2015). 
 69. See, e.g., HARRIS WILLIAMS & CO., TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE 1–2 
(2014).  
 70. Id.; QER, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
 71. RTOs and ISOs are FERC-approved non-governmental entities formed by member utilities 
and entities that produce and transmit electricity. RTOs and ISOs play a significant role in electric 
transmission planning and reliability. They exist in approximately two-thirds of the United States in 
terms of both geography and electricity demand. See Klass, supra note 51, at 1936–38. 
 72. QER, supra note 4, at 3-23; Klass, supra note 51, at 1936–40 (discussing RTOs and ISOs). 
 73. EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE v (Dec. 2016); QER, supra note 
4, at 3-6. For a discussion of the investor-owned utilities, municipal cooperatives, and private merchant 
transmission line companies that build and own electric transmission assets, see id. at 3-20–3-21. 
 74. QER, supra note 4, at 3-6. 
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to increase system reliability in light of increasingly severe weather events; 
to decrease congestion-related outages; and to interconnect new generation 
sources, particularly new utility-scale wind and solar energy and natural gas 
plants.75  
The increase in the use of renewable energy for electricity has been 
rapid. Non-hydropower renewable energy resources for electricity 
increased from approximately 1% in 2000 (excluding biomass which 
constituted 1.4%) to nearly 7% by 2013.76 From 2008 through the end of 
2013, the amount of electricity generated from wind energy more than 
tripled and the amount from solar has increased more than tenfold.77 With 
regard to wind, according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
there are over 10 million megawatts (“MWs”) of onshore wind resources, 
which are sufficient to power ten times the nation’s electricity needs.78 As 
of 2016, wind generated more than 20% of electricity needs in several states, 
most notably in the Midwest.79 On a nationwide basis, that percentage is 
more modest but increasing; in 2016 wind power alone surpassed 
hydropower as the single largest source of renewable electricity in the 
 
 
 75. Id. See also AMERICAN SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE (2011); BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 
CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. 
ELECTRIC GRID 28–33 (2013); RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42923, ELECTRICAL 
POWER: OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 7–8 (2013); JUDY W. CHANG & JOHANNES P. 
PFEIFENBERGER, THE BRATTLE GROUP, WELL-PLANNED ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SAVES CUSTOMER 
COSTS: IMPROVED TRANSMISSION PLANNING IS KEY TO THE TRANSITION TO A CARBON-CONSTRAINED 
FUTURE (2016); THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., THE POWER OF CHANGE: INNOVATION 
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INCREASINGLY CLEAN ELECTRIC POWER TECHNOLOGIES 
153–59 (Nat’l Acad. Press 2016); U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLIMATE CHANGE: ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE RISKS AND ADAPTATION EFFORTS (2014) (discussing risks climate change poses to 
aging electric grid infrastructure); Klass, supra note 51, at 1922–24; John Fialka, Modernizing the Grid: 
A Tugboat “Trying to Turn a Big Ocean Liner,” CLIMATEWIRE, July 6, 2016. 
 76. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 2013 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK (2015); U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., Renewable Share of U.S. Energy Consumption Highest Since 1930s, TODAY IN ENERGY 
(May 28, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21412; Pete Danko, 6 New Charts 
That Show U.S. Renewable Energy Progress, BREAKING ENERGY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://breakingenergy 
.com/2015/02/05 /6-new-charts-that-show-us-renewable-energy-progress/.  
 77. See QER, supra note 4, at 1-17. 
 78. See Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, American Wind Power Reaches Major Power 
Generation Milestones in 2013 (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx? 
ItemNumber=6184. 
 79. See, e.g., Daniel Cusick, Midwestern States Now Get a Fifth of Their Power from Wind, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/9MUT-EHFY (discussing surge in investment in U.S. 
wind power and the fact that several Midwestern states now produce over 20% of their electricity from 
wind energy).  
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United States.80 State renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”)81 that exist in 
over half the states have driven this growth along with rapidly falling costs 
of wind farm construction, increased transmission capacity, and federal and 
state tax incentives.82 A 2015 DOE report predicted that wind could 
generate 20% of U.S. electricity needs by 2030 and 35% by 2050.83 
Moreover, research shows that building taller wind turbines could 
substantially expand the reach of wind energy where it has not yet been 
developed.84 
The use of solar energy has also increased dramatically in the last 
decade. Although solar energy still generates less than 2% of U.S. electricity 
needs, its use nationwide has grown significantly in recent years. As of 
2016, the U.S. had over 40,000 MW of installed capacity, enough to power 
over 8 million homes.85 While solar resources are most intense in the desert 
southwest, growth in solar has occurred throughout the country, with 
California dominating the market but with rapid expansion in 
Massachusetts, Arizona, North Carolina, Texas, New Jersey, and Nevada, 
among others.86 State RPSs, tax incentives, and other state policies 
encouraging solar generation have combined with significantly falling costs 
of photovoltaic (“PV”) rooftop solar and utility scale solar over the past five 
years to bring about this transformation in the solar industry.87 Experts 
 
 
 80. U.S. Energy Info. Admin, What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source? (Apr. 1, 
2016), http://perma.cc/NT7N-CKWN. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electricity (Mar. 7, 2017) https://perm 
a.cc/33S2-9KLN (forecasting non-hydropower renewable energy will grow to 9% of total electricity 
generation in 2017 and 10% in 2018). At the end of 2016, wind energy alone surpassed hydropower for 
the first time as the largest source of renewable electricity. Diane Cardwell, Wind Surpasses Hydropower 
in a Critical Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/FKQ5-UY5G.  
 81. RPSs generally require utilities and other power providers to generate a certain percentage of 
the electric energy they sell to customers (e.g., 15%, 20%, 30%) from renewable sources by a certain 
date (e.g., 2020, 2030) or purchase Renewable Energy Credits (“RECs”) from other power providers, 
thus creating a market for renewable energy. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND GOALS (2016).  
 82. See QER, supra note 4, at 1-7 (discussing drivers for renewable energy growth). 
 83. WIND VISION, supra note 17. 
 84. Energy Department Announces $2 Million to Support Manufacturing of Taller Wind Turbine 
Towers, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY (Sept. 18, 2014), https://energy.gov/eere/articles/energy-department-
announces-2-million-support-manufacturing-taller-wind-turbine-towers [hereinafter Taller Wind 
Turbine Towers]; Diane Cardwell, Wind Power Is Poised to Spread to All States, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 
2015), http://nyti.ms/1JxUPii (discussing DOE report on ability of taller wind turbines to bring increased 
wind capacity to all 50 states). 
 85. Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, U.S. Solar Market Insight, http://www.seia.org/research-
resources/us-solar-market-insight. 
 86. See generally Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, Solar Market Insight Report 2016 Year in 
Review, http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2016-year-review; Solar 
Energy Industries Ass’n, Top 10 Solar States, http://www.seia.org/research-resources/top-10-solar-
states. 
 87. The cost of PV solar modules is about 1% of what it was thirty-five years ago, and the average 
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anticipate that solar development will continue to rise as component costs 
continue to fall and generation efficiencies increase.88 Moreover, major 
utilities have already begun to enter the solar market, procuring utility-scale 
solar, building solar gardens, and selling rooftop PV solar to retail 
customers,89 all of which will significantly increase the amount of solar 
energy on the grid.90 
New, long-distance electric transmission lines are critical to expand the 
use of renewable energy for electricity and to reduce reliance on fossil 
fuels.91 Unlike traditional sources of electric energy such as oil, natural gas, 
uranium, and coal, which can be transported to power plants near population 
centers by truck, train, or pipeline, utility scale wind and solar energy can 
only be transported via transmission lines.92 Moreover, these resources are 
often concentrated in less populated parts of the country—wind in the 
Midwest and Plains states and solar in the Southwest.93 This means that 
 
 
cost for a utility-scale PV project dropped from approximately 21¢ per KWh in 2010 to 11¢ per KWh 
at the end of 2013. See QER, supra note 4, at 1-7. Prices have fallen even further since that time. See 
Solar Energy Industries Ass’n, Solar Industry Data, http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-
industry-data. 
 88. See MIT, THE FUTURE OF SOLAR ENERGY (2015). See also Naureen S. Malik, Solar Shines as 
Sellers Sometimes Pay Buyers to Use Power, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, May 26, 2015 (noting that solar 
capacity in the United States has increased 20 times since 2008 through significant increases in utility 
scale and rooftop solar and quoting a business analyst as stating that “[s]olar is the new shale.”). 
 89. “Wholesale sales” are sales to a person or company for purposes of resale. “Retail sales” are 
sales to the ultimate user or consumer of the product, whether that product is electricity, groceries, or 
other goods. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012) (defining “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as “a 
sale of electric energy to any person for resale.”). In the realm of electricity, wholesale sales include 
sales of electricity from electricity producers to investor-owned utilities, municipal utilities, and other 
entities that sell electricity to end users. By contrast, retail sales of electricity are sales of electricity to 
residential, commercial, and industrial end users. 
 90. See Mark Chediak Southern Co. Will Sell Rooftop Solar in Georgia, Mulls Residential 
Batteries, 111 BNA DAILY ENVTL. REPORT, June 9, 2015, at A-8; SunShare and Mortenson Announce 
Strategic Agreement to Develop and Build Community Solar Gardens in Minnesota, M.A. MORTENSON 
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.mortenson.com/company/news-and-insights/2014/sunshare-and-mortenson 
-community-solar (discussing partnerships with Xcel Energy to build solar gardens to meet Minnesota’s 
solar mandate for utilities); Cory Honeyman, Utility-Scale Solar is Back from the Dead, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/utility-scale-solar-is-back-from-
the-dead.  
 91. See, e.g., CHANG & PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 75; U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, REDUCING WIND 
CURTAILMENT THROUGH TRANSMISSION EXPANSION IN A WIND VISION FUTURE iv–v (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67240.pdf [hereinafter REDUCING WIND CURTAILMENT] (finding 
that long distance transmission line expansion in the western United States is “likely to be critical” to 
achieving wind penetration of 35% by 2050 and that such grid expansion will provide “substantial 
health, environmental, and economic benefits.”). 
 92. See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 93–
99 (2d ed. 2016) (describing the electric transmission grid); Klass, supra note 51, at 1915–16 (discussing 
challenges of integrating more renewable energy into the transmission grid). 
 93. See United States—Average Annual Wind Speed at 80 m, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
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capitalizing on these renewable energy resources requires expansion and 
development of the U.S. transmission grid.94 
Both public utilities and private transmission companies, known as 
“merchant” transmission companies,95 are seeking to build new 
transmission lines to expand the use of renewable energy and increase the 
reliability of the grid.96 A growing number of these proposed new, long-
distance transmission lines are direct current (“DC”) lines which, unlike 
more commonly used alternating current (“AC”) lines, do not allow power 
to move in both direction and do not contain frequent “on-ramps” and “off-
ramps.” Because of these differences, over longer distances, DC lines are 
more efficient and lose less power over the length of the line, making them 
desirable for long distance transmission of electric energy from generation 
sites to population centers.97 
In addition to recent efforts to expand the transmission grid to integrate 
new sources of renewable energy, the technology and market developments 
taking place with regard to electricity generation and the electric grid are 
staggering. For instance, one of the limitations of wind and solar energy is 
 
 
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m_wind/USwind300dpe4-11.jpg (map showing high potential wind 
areas of the United States); Solar Energy Potential, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/maps/solar 
-energy-potential (map showing high areas of potential solar energy). 
 94. See John Fialka, China Has a “Grand Vision” for the Grid. Does Trump?, CLIMATEWIRE 
(Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2016/12/21/stories/1060047497 (discussing the 
need for more long-distance, high voltage electric transmission lines in the United States to meet “deep 
decarbonization” goals for the electric grid in addition to development and integration of enhanced 
battery storage technologies). See also REDUCING WIND CURTAILMENT, supra note 91, at iv–v 
(discussing the need for expansion of the grid to integrate greater percentages of renewable energy 
resources). 
 95. Merchant transmission line companies generate revenue solely from contracts with electricity 
generators to transmit electricity over the transmission lines they build for ultimate delivery of electricity 
to the retail electricity market by other companies. Thus, unlike state-regulated public utilities, merchant 
transmission companies do not receive a regulated, cost-based rate of return from electricity users. See 
Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 421, 424 n.13 (2011); JOSEPH H. ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., BUILDING ELECTRIC 
TRANSMISSION LINES: A REVIEW OF RECENT TRANSMISSION PROJECTS 1 (2016) (“Merchant 
transmission project developers rely on buyers of bulk transmission services to establish a project’s 
financial viability” and do not rely on “cost-based tariffs approved through related Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state ratemaking processes.”). 
 96. Klass, supra note 51, at 1925–28 (discussing proposed long-distance transmission lines 
designed to bring renewable energy to population centers); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and 
Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1116–23 (2013) (discussing rise of merchant transmission 
companies, expansion of the electric grid, and ongoing transmission line projects).  
 97. See How HVDC Works, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/ 
technology/hvdc/how (explaining benefits of DC transmission lines); About Direct Current Technology, 
CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/technology/hvdc (also describing 
advantages of DC transmission lines); John Fialka, The Birth and Troubled Childhood of an American 
Supergrid, CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 7, 2016) (discussing benefits of high-voltage DC transmission lines); 
John Fialka, Can the U.S. Develop a Supergrid Before China?, CLIMATEWIRE, Sept. 9, 2016. 
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its variability—wind farms, utility-scale solar plants, and rooftop solar PV 
panels only produce electricity when the wind blows or the sun shines. This 
means that back up generation in some form is needed so supply and 
demand in the grid are in constant balance.98 In response to this challenge, 
states, utilities, and industry experts are exploring a number of existing 
technologies to integrate higher percentages of renewable energy into the 
grid, including an increased ability to manage short-term mismatches in 
demand and supply, improved forecasts for wind production, and more 
flexibility with power plants that use fossil fuels.99 A 2015 report prepared 
by the Brattle Group for the Advanced Energy Economics Institute explored 
how Texas and Colorado were regularly able to achieve 10-20% renewable 
energy penetration levels (and much higher rates for shorter periods of time) 
using existing technologies and modest operational changes.100 As noted 
earlier, research is underway to expand the potential use of large amounts 
of wind energy outside of Texas and the Midwest by building taller turbines 
that can capture stronger, more consistent winds available at elevated 
heights throughout the country and with decreased land-use impacts.101 
Moreover, utilities and other market actors are attempting to develop 
cost-effective large-scale batteries to complement ongoing developments in 
a variety of energy storage technologies. Energy storage consists of a suite 
of technologies including batteries, pumped-storage hydropower, 
compressed air storage, flywheels, and thermal energy that retain energy 
from electricity generated at times of low demand, strong winds, or peak 
sun until demand increases.102 In 2014, Oncor, Texas’s largest transmission 
line network operator, sought regulatory approval to invest billions of 
dollars in utility-scale batteries beginning in 2018, which would allow it to 
store electricity at night, when demand—and cost—is lowest and also when 
 
 
 98. See Boyd, supra note 7, at 1626–28 (discussing mechanics of the electric grid). 
 99. See JURGEN WEISS & BRUCE TSUCHIDA, THE BRATTLE GROUP, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE 
ENERGY INTO THE ELECTRICITY GRID: CASE STUDIES SHOWING HOW SYSTEM OPERATORS ARE 
MAINTAINING RELIABILITY (2015); Edward Klump, Texas, Colo., Show How to Integrate Renewables 
as Carbon Plan Looms—Report, ENERGYWIRE, June 10, 2015 (reporting on findings of Brattle Group 
Study for Advanced Energy Economics Institute). 
 100. WEISS & TSUCHIDA, supra note 99, at 4–5. See also Umair Irfan, New Study Outlines Path to 
100% Renewables in All 50 States, CLIMATEWIRE, June 10, 2015 (discussing report by researchers 
showing how all fifty states can achieve 80% renewable energy use by 2020 and 100% renewable energy 
use by 2050 for all energy needs, not just electricity, using regional resources and gradual developments 
in technologies at reasonable cost). 
 101. Taller Wind Turbine Towers, supra note 84; Cardwell, supra note 84. 
 102. See Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 705–09 (2014) (discussing types of energy storage technologies). 
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wind energy is at its peak.103 Oncor also began micro-grid pilot projects 
using battery technology, solar energy, and back-up generators.104 Although 
Texas law currently makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Oncor to seek 
ratepayer cost recovery for these projects because they are considered 
electricity “generation” projects rather than “transmission” projects,105 in 
other parts of the country, states are actively encouraging utilities to invest 
in storage projects. For instance, California has placed mandates on utilities 
to produce 1.3 gigawatts of energy storage by 2022, along with additional 
regional procurements.106 Hawaii and New York also have multiple storage 
pilots and projects underway.107  
Moreover, FERC has recognized that energy storage can, depending on 
the project, constitute a transmission, generation, or distribution asset.108 In 
 
 
 103. James Osborne, Oncor Proposes Giant Leap for Grid, Batteries, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS 
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/2014/11/08/oncor-proposes-giant-leap-
for-grid-batteries; Robert Fares, Three Reasons Oncor’s Energy Storage Proposal Is a Game Changer, 
SCIENTIFIC AM.: PLUGGED IN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/three-
reasons-oncor-s-energy-storage-proposal-is-a-game-changer/ (explaining why the scope and scale of 
Oncor’s proposal is significant, particularly because Oncor is a regulated transmission and distribution 
company and can obtain rate recovery from consumers if the state approves the project, and thus can 
procure billions of dollars in capital); JUDY CHANG ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE VALUE OF 
DISTRIBUTED ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS (2014) (expert analysis conducted for Oncor to 
determine feasibility of large-scale battery proposal for its transmission and distribution business). 
 104. Andrew Burger, Oncor Launches Paradigm-Breaking Microgrid in Texas, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY WORLD (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2015/04/oncor-
launches-paradigm-breaking-microgrid-in-texas.html.  
 105. See Gavin Bade, Whatever Happened to Oncor’s Big Energy Storage Plans?, UTILITY DIVE 
(Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/whatever-happened-to-oncors-big-energy-storage-
plans/404949/ (reporting that Oncor, as a regulated transmission and distribution utility, cannot 
participate in energy generation markets under Texas law, and that Oncor’s proposal to use the battery 
technology to enhance renewable energy storage is considered to be on the generation side of the line 
rather than the transmission and distribution side of the line); R.A. Dyer, Commentary: Why the $5 
Billion Battery Plan Went Nowhere, FUELFIX (Oct. 8, 2015), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/10/08/ 
commentary-why-the-5-billion-battery-plan-went-nowhere/ (reporting that Oncor failed to obtain 
changes in Texas statutory law to allow it to implement its battery proposal). 
 106. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California’s Energy Storage Roadmap, CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca. 
gov/research/energystorage/tour/roadmap/ (last visited June 7, 2017); Jeff St. John, Texas Utility Oncor 
Wants to Invest $5.2 Billion in Storage: Can it Get Approval?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Texas-Utility-Oncor-Faces-Opposition-on-Its-5.2B-Bet 
-on-Distributed-Energy; Ken Kulak et al., Renewable Energy and Storage, MORGAN LEWIS (March 17, 
2016) (PowerPoint presentation), https://www.morganlewis.com/events/~/media/4d8e599ba3a24d9b8 
16b9530ff1ea4cc.ashx; Robert Mullin, FERC OKs CAISO Energy Storage Rules, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 
22, 2016). See also In re Western Grid Development, LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2010) (finding that 
Western Grid’s proposed energy storage device projects are wholesale transmission facilities). 
 107. St. John, supra note 106. 
 108. In re Western Grid Development, LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,056, at 14–15 (FERC finding that 
certain energy storage projects can constitute “transmission” assets and noting that “electricity storage 
devices, such as those that will be used in the Projects, do not readily fit into only one of the traditional 
asset functions of generation, transmission or distribution. Under certain circumstances, storage devices 
can resemble any of these functions or even load. For this reason, the Commission has addressed the 
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April 2016, FERC opened a proceeding to consider regulatory issues related 
to energy storage and to determine whether barriers exist at the RTO/ISO 
and/or state levels that are hindering the development of this important 
electricity resource.109 Several months later, in November 2016, FERC 
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would require each RTO/ISO 
to revise its tariff to create new market rules to accommodate the 
participation of electric storage resources in wholesale electricity markets, 
including participation by distributed energy resource aggregators.110 To the 
extent these efforts continue at the federal level, it may significantly 
accelerate and enhance the integration of energy storage resources into 
electric grid management.  
Finally, since 2015, Tesla Motors has been selling two new forms of 
electric battery storage. The first, called the Powerwall, was designed for 
homeowners with PV rooftop solar panels.111 The batteries were priced 
between $3,000 and $7,000 and use lithium-ion technology. Tesla also 
offered a larger Powerpack 100-kWh battery tower, designed for 
commercial and utility customers. The Powerpack gives utilities the option 
of not using grid power when it is most expensive, such as when air 
conditioning use is high in the summer or at other peak demand times during 
the day.112 In 2016, Tesla unveiled its second-generation Powerwall 2, with 
greater energy density and a built-in power inverter.113 The development of 
commercial products that can store electric energy on a widespread basis 
has the potential to reduce many of the grid reliability and variability issues 
associated with integrating greater percentages of renewable energy into the 
grid. Tesla’s entry into the battery storage market has caused the public and 
 
 
classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 109. See, e.g., William H. Holmes & Molly Suda, FERC Staff Seeks Comments on Participation of 
Electric Storage Resources in Wholesale Electricity Markets, K&L GATES: LEGAL INSIGHTS (Apr. 22, 
2016), http://www.klgates.com/ferc-staff-seeks-comments-on-participation-of-electric-storage-resourc 
es-in-wholesale-electricity-markets-04-22-2016/.  
 110. See News Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Proposes to Integrate Electricity 
Storage into Organized Markets (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2016/2016 
-4/11-17-16-E-1.asp#.WC8lrbROKhA; Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission 
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 157 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2016). 
 111. See David Ferris, Tesla Makes Itself the Center of the Energy-Storage Universe, ENERGYWIRE 
(May 6, 2015); Anne C. Mulkern, Tesla Says it Will Double Capacity of Home Battery, ENERGYWIRE 
(June 10, 2015).  
 112. Mulkern, supra note 111.  
 113. See Julian Spector, Here’s Everything New About Tesla’s Updated Powerwall 2.0, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/what-really-matters 
-from-tesla-battery-powerwall-powerpack (reporting on second generation Powerwall and Powerpack 
batteries); Powerwall 2, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/powerwall. 
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investors to pay closer attention to battery storage technology, which means 
the technology and markets are likely to grow at a much more rapid pace, 
particularly if the costs of the technology, which are currently extremely 
high, can be reduced.114  
Advanced battery technology has significant implications for utility 
scale generation and distributed energy resources that power individual 
homes, businesses, and smaller communities apart from the larger 
transmission grid.115 Indeed, these developments in battery technology 
provide the potential to retain power in localized areas during major storms 
and hurricanes, to help utilities even out power flow on a daily basis, and to 
allow consumers in parts of the country with extremely high electricity 
prices, like Hawaii, to partially or fully leave the grid.116 Researchers are 
also exploring the use of natural gas turbines to act as a regular backup for 
renewable energy, thus using cost-effective, existing technologies to allow 
integration of large percentages of renewable energy into the grid.117 And 
Commonwealth Edison, the dominant utility in Chicago and throughout the 
northern part of Illinois, has proposed ambitious microgrid projects that 
would bring together distributed energy, microgrids, smart meters, and 
energy efficiency programs to avoid power outages in times of severe 
weather, reduce electricity costs, and increase the use of renewable energy 
through solar PV, fuel cells, and energy storage.118 However, questions 
remain over how long it will take these technologies to become an integral 
part of the electricity system, based on economics, technology scale-up, and 
 
 
 114. See Ferris, supra note 111; David Labrador, How Much Does Storage Really Cost? Lazard 
Weighs In, RMI OUTLET (Jan. 21, 2016), http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2016_01_21_how_much_does_ 
storage_really_cost_lazard_weighs_in (discussing costs of battery storage). 
 115. Rebecca Kern, Integrating New Distributed Energy Resources into Grid Continues to 
Challenge Regulators, 88 DAILY ENVTL. REPORT, May 7, 2015, at A-1 (discussing need for utilities and 
state regulators to develop technologies and programs to modernize the grid as well as facilitate and 
integrate distributed energy models). 
 116. Anne C. Mulkern, SolarCity Plans to Sell Hawaii on Off-Grid Solar Package Using Tesla 
Battery, CLIMATEWIRE (May 6, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060018058 
(reporting on potential uses of commercial-scale batteries). 
 117. See Irfan, supra note 100. 
 118. Daniel Cusick, Historic Chicago Neighborhood Points Way to Energy’s Future, 
CLIMATEWIRE (June 6, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2016/06/06/stories/1060038298. See 
also LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 705–20 (2015) (describing U.S. smart grid 
developments); U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, TRANSFORMING THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE 
SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS S-4, 
S-6 (Jan. 2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Transforming%20the%20Nation%E2% 
80%99s%20Electricity%20System--Summary%20for%20Policymakers.pdf (defining the “smart grid” 
and explaining its importance for increasing grid reliability, lowering electricity costs, and increasing 
energy efficiency). 
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state and federal energy storage policies.119 These advances—from 
incremental improvements in renewable energy to breakthrough 
technologies—will allow wind and solar to penetrate electricity markets at 
higher rates and demand energy transport infrastructure to accommodate 
this growth. 
Despite this potential for significant change, as discussed in more detail 
in Part II, state laws often limit the ability of both utilities and merchant 
transmission companies to make necessary expansions to the grid to address 
reliability and to increase the ability to use renewable energy to generate 
electricity.120 Unlike interstate natural gas pipelines that apply for and 
receive approval and eminent domain authority from a single federal 
agency—FERC—transmission line operators must obtain siting approval 
and eminent domain authority from each state in the path of the line. Many 
states do not even allow merchant transmission companies to seek a 
certificate of need to build a transmission line, instead limiting that right to 
incumbent, in-state public utilities.121 Moreover, transmission lines are 
controversial for their perceived land use and aesthetic impacts, and many 
state public utility commissions question the local “need” for the line, 
particularly if the line only passes through the state and does not deliver 
electricity from or to the state.122 Part II explores these regulatory challenges 
in more detail as well as their implications for developing sustainable and 
adaptive infrastructure for future energy needs. 
II. EVALUATING EXISTING ENERGY TRANSPORT SITING LAWS 
This Part analyzes a select group of federal and state laws that regulate 
the siting of energy transport infrastructure in order to evaluate the aspects 
of these laws that most facilitate or impede the development of energy 
transport infrastructure that can meet present energy needs as well as remain 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., John Fialka, Will the World’s Largest Storage Battery Be America’s Energy Cure?, 
CLIMATEWIRE (July 7, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039876. 
 120. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: 
POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28–33 (2013); MIT, THE FUTURE OF THE 
ELECTRIC GRID (2011).  
 121. For a survey of states that do and do not allow merchant transmission lines companies to 
seeking siting certificates and exercise eminent domain for electric transmission lines see Klass, supra 
note 96, at 1079, 1123–26, app. A. 
 122. See Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for 
Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 181–84 (2015) (discussing examples in Arizona and 
Missouri where state regulators refused to issue a siting certificate for an interstate transmission line 
because of lack of in-state “need” for the line and a perception that the benefits of the line would go 
solely to neighboring states). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
854 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:827 
 
 
 
 
 
relevant in an uncertain future. As stated at the outset, this Article assumes 
that part of this future should include a goal of transitioning to a cleaner and 
more sustainable energy future.  
As mentioned earlier, there are significant differences in the regulatory 
approval regimes for interstate oil pipelines, interstate natural gas pipelines, 
and interstate electric transmission lines.123 Interstate oil pipelines and 
interstate electric transmission lines require siting approval and eminent 
domain authority from each affected state.124 By contrast, interstate natural 
gas pipelines need not obtain state siting approval or eminent domain 
authority from affected states but instead can obtain a single approval from 
FERC.125 Since 2005, the same federal process applies to liquefied natural 
gas import and export terminals.126 This Part considers the federal laws 
governing the siting and eminent domain for interstate natural gas pipelines 
and LNG terminals and state laws governing siting and eminent domain for 
interstate electric transmission lines. In its evaluation of these laws, this Part 
is able to consider the benefits and drawbacks of federal regulation versus 
state regulation of energy transport infrastructure as well as laws that govern 
different types of energy resources. 
An evaluation of these laws allows at least three conclusions. First, it is 
easier to mount successful opposition to interstate energy transport 
infrastructure projects when local and state laws govern than when federal 
law governs. Second, laws that focus on state and local energy needs and 
benefits as opposed to regional or national needs and benefits are not well 
suited to building interstate energy transport networks. Third, creating laws 
that do not lock in assumptions regarding the location, amount, and type of 
energy resources for transport allow needed flexibility in the energy 
transport system. 
A.  Federal Siting Authority for Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines and LNG 
Import/Export Terminal 
Unlike the siting process for interstate oil pipelines and interstate electric 
transmission lines, one federal agency—FERC—controls the siting and 
approval process for both interstate natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals 
required to import or export LNG across oceans. Federal control over the 
siting of interstate natural gas pipelines dates back to the Natural Gas Act 
 
 
 123. See supra notes 32–34, 60–62, 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 32–34, 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 126. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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of 1938, when Congress first gave the Federal Power Commission (now 
FERC) authority to regulate sales and transportation of natural gas in 
interstate commerce, and the facilities used for such sales and 
transportation.127 Amendments to the Natural Gas Act in 1947 authorized 
FERC to grant nationwide eminent domain authority to pipelines receiving 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity, which allowed pipelines 
to overcome state opposition to natural gas transport infrastructure that had 
led to gas shortages on the East Coast and consequential industry shutdowns 
in the 1940s.128 Today, Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act provides a process 
whereby the pipeline operator can seek a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity from FERC to build an interstate natural gas pipeline after a 
review of the economic and environmental impacts of the pipeline.129  
In contrast to the established federal process for siting and approving 
interstate natural gas pipelines that has existed since the 1940s, the division 
of authority between the federal government and the states over the siting 
of LNG terminals remained ambiguous until Congress created express 
federal authority and preempted state authority in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005.130 As shown below, this transfer of siting authority to FERC allowed 
industry to change course quite rapidly on the infrastructure needed to 
respond to market forces in the natural gas sector both when shortages were 
anticipated in the late 2000s and, more recently, in response to industry 
demands to export newly available shale gas resources. The remainder of 
this Section discusses the LNG import and export process, the conflicts 
between the states and the federal government over authority to site LNG 
terminals, the amendments to the Natural Gas Act created by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 granting FERC exclusive federal authority over siting 
LNG terminals, and the implications of that change for U.S. natural gas 
transportation. 
 
 
 127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2012) (providing federal authority over natural gas rates and 
charges); 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(c)–(h) (providing federal authority over natural gas facilities); Minisink 
Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. F.E.R.C., 762 F.3d 97, 101–02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing federal 
process for siting and approving interstate natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act); Klass, supra 
note 51, at 1906–07 (describing federal siting process for interstate natural gas pipelines and events 
contributing to Congress’s decision to transfer authority over interstate natural gas pipeline siting from 
the states to the federal government). 
 128. See Klass, supra note 51, at 1906–07 (describing landowner and state opposition to interstate 
natural gas pipelines in the 1940s and subsequent amendments to the Natural Gas Act in 1947 to create 
federal eminent domain authority for such pipelines). 
 129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(c)–(h) (providing federal authority over natural gas facilities); Minisink, 762 
F.3d at 101–02 (describing federal process for siting and approving interstate natural gas pipelines under 
the Natural Gas Act). 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b. 
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1. The LNG Import and Export Process 
LNG is natural gas that has been cooled to at or below -260º F.131 At this 
temperature, LNG changes from a gas to a clear, colorless, odorless liquid, 
and its volume is reduced by a factor of 600 to 1.132 Because its liquid state 
occupies a substantially smaller volume of space than its gaseous form, it 
can be stored and transported more efficiently than natural gas. When it is 
warmed, LNG “regasifies” and is suitable for transportation in pipelines and 
is usable in the same manner as conventional natural gas.133 There are two 
types of LNG terminals. The first type, which converts natural gas into 
LNG, is an export facility, typically called a “liquefaction terminal.” The 
second type, which handles imports and converts LNG back into natural 
gas, is called a “regasification terminal.”134 At the LNG export facility, 
natural gas is liquefied, processed, and pumped into tankers designed 
specifically to store and transport LNG over long distances.135 Once an LNG 
tanker arrives at an import facility, the LNG within it is pumped into an 
insulated storage tank and, ultimately, regasified for shipment via pipelines 
or tanker trucks for delivery to customers.136  
In January 1959, the world’s first LNG tanker, The Methane Pioneer, a 
converted World War II liberty freighter, carried an LNG cargo from Lake 
Charles, Louisiana to Canvey Island, United Kingdom.137 Between 1971 
and 1980, four import terminals and one export terminal (in Alaska) were 
built in the United States.138 When the four import terminals opened in the 
1970s, they began importing new quantities of LNG, but imports quickly 
declined by the early 1980s, when market conditions caused LNG prices to 
greatly exceed lower priced domestic natural gas.139 However, the rapid 
 
 
 131. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, A GUIDE TO LNG: WHAT ALL CITIZENS SHOULD KNOW 
1 (2005); see also Rachel Clingman & Audrey Cumming, The 2005 Energy Policy Act: Analysis of the 
Jurisdictional Basis for Federal Siting of LNG Facilities, 2 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 57, 60 (2006). 
 132. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 131.  
 133. PAUL W. PARFOMAK & AARON M. FLYNN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32205, LIQUEFIED 
NATURAL GAS (LNG) IMPORT TERMINALS: SITING, SAFETY AND REGULATION 2 (2004). 
 134. Hobart King, What is LNG—Liquefied Natural Gas?, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/ 
articles/lng-liquefied-natural-gas/ (last visited June 7, 2017). 
 135. MICHELLE MICHOT FOSS, CTR. FOR ENERGY ECON., INTRODUCTION TO LNG 17–20 (2012); 
see also Clingman & Cumming, supra note 131, at 61. 
 136. FOSS, supra note 135, at 20–21.  
 137. Id. at 11. 
 138. KEVIN LANDFRIED ET AL., LNG INDUSTRY, BRIDGING THE GAP, 1 (2005).  
 139. See Monica Berry, Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals: Jurisdiction Over Siting, 
Construction, and Operation in the Context of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 26 ENERGY L.J. 135, 
137 (2005); Phillip R. Weems & Harry W. Sullivan, Jr., LNG at 50—History and Projected Future for 
Liquefied Natural Gas Exports in an Unconventional Era, 60 ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 6-1, 6-17–6-18 
(2014) (discussing history of United States’ failed attempt at meaningful LNG imports in the 1970s as a 
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increase in domestic natural gas prices between 2000 and 2005, and 
heightened demand based on natural gas’s environmental benefits over coal 
created a second and more powerful push for LNG imports by 2005.140  
2. Federalism Conflicts and the LNG Siting Provisions of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 
As noted above, the Natural Gas Act governs the regulation, 
transportation, import, and export of natural gas. DOE approves the import 
and export of natural gas through its Office of Fossil Energy, and the Natural 
Gas Act grants FERC authority to approve any LNG terminal used to import 
or export natural gas.141 If the United States has a Free Trade Agreement 
(“FTA”) with a foreign nation for natural gas, the application for import or 
export is automatically deemed consistent with the “public interest,” and 
DOE must grant it without delay.142 Exports to non-FTA nations are 
presumed to be in the public interest unless, after opportunity for a hearing, 
the DOE finds that the authorization would not be consistent with the public 
interest.143  
Under Section 3(e) of the Natural Gas Act, FERC has “exclusive 
authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, 
expansion, or operation of an LNG terminal.”144 This section of the Natural 
Gas Act was added as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as Congress 
attempted to clarify disputes between FERC and the states over the authority 
for LNG terminal siting.145 FERC regulations implementing Section 3(e) 
 
 
result of pricing policies). 
 140. See supra notes 48–50 (discussing increase in U.S. natural gas prices in the early 2000s); Jacob 
Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers 
in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 473 (2006). 
 141. See, e.g., In re Sabine Pass Liquefaction, DOE/FE Order 3669 (June 26, 2015), http://op.bna. 
com/der.nsf/id/rken-9xunpc/$File/Sabine_Pass.pdf (order granting approval of LNG exports and 
explaining in detail the DOE and FERC approval processes). 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012). DOE regulations implementing the natural gas import and export 
provisions of the Natural Gas Act are at 10 C.F.R. § 590 (2012). Free Trade Agreement countries for 
natural gas are Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, Singapore, and South Korea. See How to 
Obtain Authorization to Import and/or Export Natural Gas and LNG, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 
http://energy.gov/fe/services/natural-gas-regulation/how-obtain-authorization-import-andor-export-
natural-gas-and-lng#LNG. Not all of these countries have LNG import terminals or import significant 
amounts of natural gas. See INT’L GAS UNION, WORLD LNG REPORT – 2014 EDITION (2014). 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a).  
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1). 
 145. See infra notes 148–158 and accompanying text. See also 15 U.S.C. § 717a(11) (defining LNG 
terminal and limiting Natural Gas Act siting authority for LNG terminals to facilities located “onshore 
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require the applicant to include in its application a statement demonstrating 
that the proposal “is not inconsistent with the public interest” and, if 
possible, demonstrate that the proposal will “improve access to supplies of 
natural gas, serve new market demand, enhance the reliability, security, 
and/or flexibility of the applicant’s pipeline system, improve the 
dependability of international energy trade, or enhance competition within 
the United States for natural gas transportation or supply.”146 The applicant 
should also demonstrate that the new terminal will not impair the applicant’s 
ability to render transportation service in the U.S. to existing customers or 
that the facility will not restrict or prevent other U.S. companies from 
extending their activities in the same general area.147  
Prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, however, neither the Natural Gas 
Act nor any other federal law provided express authority for FERC to 
approve LNG terminals.148 But during the 1970s, when U.S. construction of 
LNG terminals began, FERC, with approval of the courts began to rely on 
Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA to assert authority over such terminals.149 No 
one challenged FERC’s jurisdiction over LNG terminals until over three 
decades later.150 In October 2003, Sound Energy Solutions (“SES”) was 
preparing to file an application with FERC under Section 3 of the Natural 
Gas Act for the construction of an LNG import terminal in Long Beach, 
California, when the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) 
informed SES of its intent to exercise jurisdiction over the project.151 The 
CPUC argued that since the gas to be imported would only be distributed 
intrastate, FERC did not have authority to regulate the terminal’s 
construction.152 In January 2004, SES ignored the CPUC’s demand for an 
 
 
or in State waters.”). LNG facilities located beyond state waters are licensed under the Deepwater Port 
Act, which requires the applicant to obtain a license from the United States Maritime Administration 
(“MARAD”) within the U.S. Department of Transportation, in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard, 
and also obtain approval from the governor or governors of the adjacent states. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 
et seq. (2012); Memorandum from Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy et al., to Senate Energy 
and Natural Res. Comm. 3–5 (June 30, 2013), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/ 
serve?File_id=fb60c4c3-bff2-4fd5-b669-bf0049c4689b (explaining onshore and offshore LNG 
permitting processes); Hannah Northey, Cuomo Rejects Offshore LNG Terminal, E&E NEWS PM (Nov. 
12, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/pm/2015/11/12 (reporting that Governor Cuomo of New York vetoed 
Liberty Natural Gas LLC’s proposal to build and operate a $300 million offshore LNG import facility 
and that Governor Christie of New Jersey planned to veto the project as well). 
 146. 18 C.F.R. § 153.7(c)(1) (2012). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (2000). 
 149. See Dweck et al., supra note 140, at 477. 
 150. Notice of Intervention and Protest of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, 
Sound Energy Solutions, 106 FERC ¶ 61,279 (2004) (No. CP04-58-000) [hereinafter CPUC Protest]. 
 151. Id. at 3. 
 152. Id. 
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application for construction of the facility, and filed its application solely 
with FERC.153 CPUC protested the application with FERC, and FERC 
issued a declaratory order claiming exclusive jurisdiction over the project 
and encouraged state and local agencies to cooperate with it.154  
After FERC denied the CPUC’s request for a hearing, CPUC petitioned 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to settle the jurisdictional 
dispute between itself and FERC.155 At the same time the case was pending, 
other local and state opposition threatened to delay LNG projects across the 
country, raising concerns over potential gas shortages and high prices.156 
FERC thus sought action from Congress to confirm FERC’s exclusive 
authority over the siting of LNG terminals in order to prevent delays in the 
siting process.157 Before the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling in the case, and 
despite opposition from the states, President Bush signed the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, which included provisions granting FERC exclusive 
jurisdiction over LNG terminal siting and preempting state and local 
authority, into law on August 8, 2005.158  
The Congressional hearings reveal that there were many reasons for the 
strong state opposition to vesting exclusive siting authority over LNG 
 
 
 153. Declaratory Order Asserting Exclusive Jurisdiction, Sound Energy Solutions, 106 FERC 
¶ 61,279 (2004) (No. CP04-58-000); see also CPUC Protest, supra note 150, at 3. 
 154. 106 FERC ¶ 61,279; Order Denying Reh’g, Denying Stay, and Clarifying Prior Order, 107 
FERC ¶ 61,263 (2004); Order on Clarification, 108 FERC ¶ 61,155 (2004); In re Sound Energy 
Solutions, 2005 WL 4052298 (Cal. P.U.C. Nov. 18, 2005) (finding the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
mooted the Commission’s appeal). 
 155. See In re Sound Energy Solutions, 2005 WL 4052298 (discussing litigation). 
 156. Natural Gas: Symposium Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. 
2 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Symposium] (statement of Sen. Domenici) (discussing decreasing natural 
gas supplies, increasing demand, and increased costs to consumers); Eben Kaplan, Liquefied Natural 
Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 27, 2006), www.cfr.org/ 
natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas-potential-terrorist-target/p9810 (discussing local opposition to LNG 
terminals); Eileen Gauna, LNG Facility Siting and Environmental (In)Justice: Is It Time for a National 
Siting Scheme?, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 101–06 (2007) (discussing local opposition to 
LNG terminals in the mid-2000s on grounds ranging from environmental harm, terrorist attacks, and 
explosions, resulting in “a NIMBY phenomenon on a national scale”); James B. Lebeck, Note, Liquefied 
Natural Gas Terminals, Community Decisionmaking, and the 2005 Energy Policy Act, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
243, 243–44 (2006) (discussing local concerns over environmental and other risks associated with LNG 
terminals and the fact that the benefits of such terminals, other than local jobs, are more diffuse). 
 157. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594; Ensuring Jobs for Our 
Future with Secure and Reliable Energy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of 
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (summary of testimony of Cynthia A. 
Marlette, General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (requesting provisions in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to confirm exclusive FERC authority). 
 158. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 311, 313. See also Dweck, et al., supra note 140, at 479–81 
(discussing litigation and enactment of LNG terminal siting provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005). 
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terminals with FERC. California officials were concerned that exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over LNG terminals would take away the “meaningful 
role” that the state should be able to play “in determining the appropriate 
location of any gas terminal within the state’s boundaries.”159 The Chair of 
the California Coastal Commission contended that the provisions were 
“directly contrary to California’s strong interest in safeguarding its precious 
coastal resources from offshore oil and gas drilling-related activities.”160 
Other members of Congress raised the fact that the bill “directly undermines 
the ability of State and local officials to ensure that any new LNG facility is 
not sited in an area where it could pose a danger to the surrounding 
community.”161 
However, there were also strong supporters for granting FERC exclusive 
jurisdiction over LNG terminals. David Garman representing the DOE 
testified before a House of Representatives Committee regarding the 
increasing need for LNG and the need for timely siting of terminals:  
Given the situation we face, we need more LNG both in the Northeast 
and around the Nation. And, it is critical that necessary LNG import 
facilities receive appropriate permits and approvals in a timely and 
orderly manner. We believe a uniform national policy and Federal 
regulation of LNG import and related facilities best serves this 
goal.162  
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources heard testimony 
regarding imminent shortages of natural gas in the United States. The EIA 
had reported that natural gas imports were expected to rise from 6 million 
cubic feet of LNG to 6.4 trillion cubic feet by 2025 due to expected domestic 
natural gas shortages, and that natural gas imports would rise from 15% of 
total consumption in 2005 to 25% by 2025.163 But the bulk of the hearing 
focused on the difficulty of constructing LNG infrastructure to meet 
 
 
 159. 151 CONG. REC. H2188 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2005) (statement of Cruz M. Bustamante, 
Lieutenant Governor, California). Members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the 
House Committee on Resources also expressed concern that states would have to seek FERC permission 
before conducting safety inspections and would be barred from taking independent enforcement actions 
against LNG terminal operators if safety violations occurred. Id. at H2186 (statements of Reps. Eshoo, 
Waxman, Capps, Napolitano, Miller, and Solis). 
 160. Id. at H2188 (statement of Meg Caldwell, Chair, California Coastal Commission). 
 161. Id. at H2181 (statement of Rep. Jim McGovern).  
 162. LNG Import Terminal and Deepwater Port Siting: Federal and State Roles: Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Energy Policy of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 26–27 (2004) (statement 
of David Garman, Acting Under Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy). 
 163. Senate Symposium, supra note 156, at 2. 
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expected natural gas import needs. Mark Robinson, Director of the Office 
of Energy Projects for FERC, testified:  
There is the potential for the public to get to a point on infrastructure 
where they want you to be able to answer . . . that there is no risk 
associated with whatever infrastructure it is that you may have to 
have to accommodate our economy. I cannot do that and I do not 
think anyone can.164  
With regard to the siting of natural gas facilities, an industry representative 
testified that “[w]e do not have the luxury of choosing to just say no to new 
pipelines or to new natural gas development or to LNG terminals” and thus 
Congress should create “adult supervision” by affirming FERC’s exclusive 
siting authority for LNG terminals.165 Mr. Robinson from FERC also 
testified that “we need help with siting basically because it is not good 
enough to site infrastructure where people want it, where people can accept 
it.”166 He urged that Congress create, among other things, “clear jurisdiction 
for a lead agency” and development of a single federal record.167  
Ultimately, Congress sided with supporters of the federal LNG siting 
provisions and included federal siting provisions in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005.168 Although Congress granted FERC exclusive authority over the 
siting of LNG terminals, it placed that authority in Section 3, not Section 7 
(governing approvals of natural gas pipelines), which meant that it did not 
convey federal eminent domain authority in connection with constructing 
LNG terminals, even though FERC has requested such authority.169 In 
addition to granting FERC exclusive federal jurisdiction over LNG 
terminals, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 clarified the state’s role in FERC’s 
safety and environmental review of onshore LNG terminal applications and 
reserved certain rights to states.170 Section 3(d) of the Natural Gas Act 
 
 
 164. Id. at 28. 
 165. Id. at 39–40 (statement of Keith Rattie, Chairman, CEO, and President, Questar Corporation). 
 166. Id. at 40. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012). 
 169. See Order Granting Authority Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act and Issuing Certificates, 
In re Broadwater Energy LLC, 122 FERC ¶ 61,255, at 10 (2008), vacated, 140 FERC ¶ 61,009 (2012) 
(discussing differences between FERC authority under Sections 3 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act). 
Arguably, eminent domain authority is less necessary for LNG facilities than for interstate natural gas 
pipelines because there are far fewer “assembly problems” with an LNG facility than for an interstate 
natural gas pipeline that must cross hundreds of parcels of land and multiple states. 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d); see also Christopher M. Crane, State Authority in Siting of Liquefied 
Natural Gas Import Terminals, 14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 31–33 (2006). 
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expressly reserves for states those powers Congress has delegated to them 
under other statutes to review and regulate certain projects, such the Clean 
Air Act (“CAA”), the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (“CZMA”).171 Additionally, the new LNG siting 
provisions require FERC to implement a “pre-filing” procedure for LNG 
terminal applications under the National Environmental Policy Act to 
encourage applicant cooperation with state and local officials.172 The 
Governor of a State in which an LNG terminal is proposed must designate 
an agency to consult with FERC on state and local safety considerations 
during application review.173 The state agency may provide an advisory 
report to FERC on safety issues, to which FERC must respond.174 Finally, 
states may conduct safety inspections of operating LNG terminals to 
evaluate facility conformance with federal regulations.175  
With the pressure to build new interstate natural gas pipelines and LNG 
export terminals since the hydraulic fracturing boom in the late 2000s, states 
have begun to be more active in using their federally delegated authority 
under the CZMA and the CWA to block infrastructure projects. For 
instance, in 2009, in AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Wilson, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld Maryland’s denial of CWA 
Section 401 water quality certification for a proposed LNG export facility 
adjacent to Baltimore Harbor based on adverse impacts on the state’s water 
quality.176 Environmental groups have also challenged the approval or 
expansion of LNG terminals in recent years but none of those challenges 
have succeeded to date. For instance, the Sierra Club has challenged 
multiple LNG terminals including the Dominion Cove Point LNG terminal 
in Maryland, the Freeport LNG terminal in Texas, and the Sabine Pass and 
Cameron LNG terminals in Louisiana.177 The Sierra Club has argued that 
 
 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (“nothing in this chapter affects the rights of States” under the CWA, 
CAA, or CZMA). See also Dweck et al., supra note 140, at 481. The first major U.S. law to address 
water pollution was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948. Congress enacted significant 
amendments to the law in 1972 and, as amended, the law is commonly known as the “Clean Water Act.” 
See History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-
water-act. 
 172. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(a); Pre-filing Procedures and Review Process for LNG Terminal 
Facilities and Other Natural Gas Facilities Prior to Filing of Applications, 18 C.F.R. § 157.21. 
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(b).  
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(c). 
 175. 15 U.S.C. § 717b-1(d). 
 176. 589 F.3d 721, 723, 730–31 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 177. See, e.g., In re Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, 139 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2012) (FERC order 
granting authorization to construct LNG export facility); In re Sabine Pass Liquefaction Expansion, 
LLC, 151 FERC ¶ 61,253 (2015) (order denying Sierra Club’s request for rehearing on order approving 
LNG export facility expansion); Stop LNG Exports, SIERRA CLUB, http://content.sierraclub.org/ 
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expansion of LNG exports will increase hydraulic fracturing of U.S. shale 
formations and cause adverse environmental impacts, including air 
pollution, water pollution, and climate change impacts.178  
3. The Shift from U.S. Natural Gas Imports to U.S. Natural Gas 
Exports 
After 2005, FERC approved multiple new LNG import terminals—five 
new terminals in the latter half of the 2000s and others that were re-
commissioned or expanded during that time period, bringing the total 
number to eleven.179 But after the late 2000s, the development of hydraulic 
fracturing and directional drilling technologies completely changed the U.S. 
natural gas landscape. Thus, many of these import terminals have since 
applied to convert to export facilities to align with the new influx of 
domestic natural gas.180 Additionally, between the end of 2012 and early 
2014 FERC approved five new LNG export terminals in response to 
producer requests and issued additional approvals in 2014 and 2015.181 As 
of January 2016, FERC had received forty-eight applications for permits 
either to construct export facilities at existing LNG import terminals or for 
new LNG export terminals.182 Eight of these liquefaction projects would 
 
 
naturalgas/stop-lng-exports (discussing Sierra Club’s continued opposition to every proposed new LNG 
facility in the United States because of the adverse environmental effects of natural gas development on 
air, water, and climate); Sierra Club Continues Fight Against LNG Exports: Files Protest Against 
Golden Pass LNG Export Project, SUTHERLAND LNG (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.lnglawblog.com/ 
2014/08/sierra-club-continues-fight-against-lng-exports-files-protest-against-golden-pass-lng-export-
project (same). 
 178. Mark Westlund, Groups Appeal Federal Approval of Cove Point LNG Export Facility, SIERRA 
CLUB (May 7, 2015), http://content.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2015/05/groups-appeal-federal-approv 
al-cove-point-lng-export-facility; In re Sabine Pass Liquefaction Expansion LLC, 151 FERC ¶ 61,253. 
 179. QER, supra note 4, app. B, at 23 & tbl. B-6; RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7–10. 
 180. RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 3, 7. 
 181. Energy Department Conditionally Authorizes Cameron LNG to Export Liquefied Natural Gas, 
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY (Feb. 11, 2014), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-department-conditionally-
authorizes-cameron-lng-export-liquefied-natural-gas. See also Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 30, at 
1001–02 (discussing LNG projects); RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7; Office of Energy Projects, 
supra note 64; EIA: LNG Export Terminals Under Construction, More Planned, OILONLINE PRESS 
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.oilonline.com/news/midstream/eia-lng-export-terminals-under-constructi 
on-more-planned; EIA, NATURAL GAS IMPORTS & EXPORTS 2014 (May 11, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/ 
naturalgas/importsexports/annual (discussing status of FERC approvals of LNG export terminals); 
Jonathan N. Crawford, Lake Charles LNG Export Facility Gets Approval of Federal Regulator, 243 
BNA DAILY ENVTL. REPORT, Dec. 18, 2015, at A-12 (reporting on FERC approval of Energy Transfer 
Equity LP’s Lake Charles LNG Export Facility). 
 182. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 3. See also North American LNG Export Terminals 
Proposed, FERC (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/lng-proposed-   
export.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
864 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:827 
 
 
 
 
 
adapt an existing LNG import terminal to be used for export at a cost of $6-
10 billion per terminal while the remaining applications were to construct 
new export terminals at a cost of $20 billion each.183  
4. Implications of federal siting authority for natural gas transport 
expansion 
The availability of a streamlined, federal siting process for interstate 
natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals has significant implications for the 
ability to expand natural gas transport infrastructure. As noted earlier, in 
response to electric utilities’ increased reliance on natural gas in the 
electricity sector since the late 2000s, the industry has been able to make 
major expansions to the natural gas pipeline system in a relatively short 
period of time.184 Reports show that after the widespread adoption of 
hydraulic fracturing technologies in the late 2000s, FERC-regulated gas 
transmission capacity increased quickly.185 In testimony before Congress in 
2013, a FERC commissioner testified that the nation’s system for expanding 
pipeline capacity has “worked well” and that over the past decade “FERC 
has issued permits for construction of nearly 10,000 miles of new 
pipeline.”186 Although members of Congress have introduced bills to further 
expedite the siting process for natural gas pipelines,187 industry has been 
able to expand interstate natural gas infrastructure quite rapidly to respond 
to increased production under existing law. Since the amendments to the 
Natural Gas Act in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the same federal process 
now exists for LNG terminals. This process, coupled with an improved 
investment climate created by Congress and FERC authorizing LNG 
terminals to enter into long-term contracts with users,188 has allowed 
 
 
 183. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 7. 
 184. See PARFOMAK, supra note 68, at 8 & fig. 2. 
 185. INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASS’N OF AM. FOUND., NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL GAS 
MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 8–9 (2011); PARFOMAK, 
supra note 68, at 8–9. 
 186. See PARFOMAK, supra note 68, at 9. 
 187. See Id. at 7–12 (discussing legislative proposals). 
 188. A provision of Energy Policy Act of 2005 prohibited FERC from requiring LNG terminal 
applicants to operate on an open-access basis, thus allowing long-term contracts with users. See 15 
U.S.C. § 171b(e)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). Although this legislative prohibition expired in 2015, FERC had 
already begun to exempt LNG terminals from common carrier obligations on a case-by-case basis as 
early as 2002 on grounds that it would be in the public interest. See Hackberry LNG Terminal LLC, 101 
FERC ¶ 61,294 (2002); Cameron LNG, formerly d/b/a/ Hackberry Terminal LNG, 104 FERC ¶ 61,269 
(2003); See also David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2017) 
(discussing improved investment climate for LNG terminals as a result of this policy change). 
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industry to change course quite rapidly on the infrastructure needed to 
respond to new market forces in the natural gas sector.  
This is not to say that the industry is completely satisfied with the current 
process. There have been calls for DOE and FERC to streamline their 
processes and particularly for DOE to expedite approval of LNG exports to 
non-FTA nations.189 And increasing opposition to all forms of energy 
transport infrastructure for fossil fuels by environmental groups, local 
residents, and some states has led to increasing scrutiny of natural gas 
pipelines and LNG terminals and calls for increased environmental review 
by FERC.190 Likewise, environmental groups and landowners are not 
satisfied with the existing process because it allows fossil fuel infrastructure 
to expand much more quickly than if a state siting and eminent domain 
process were available to more fully take into account local environmental 
and land use concerns. However, this latter critique simply highlights the 
fact that because a single, federal regulator—FERC—has authority to 
approve projects, it is less likely that a groundswell of sentiment focused on 
the local costs of a project can easily derail it. This is why many state and 
environmental interests opposed FERC’s exclusive siting authority over 
LNG terminals in the 2005 Energy Policy Act,191 and have since had only 
limited success opposing projects even if they may be able to slow them 
down in some circumstances.192 
For both natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals, it is unlikely the 
industry could have expanded the interstate natural gas transport 
infrastructure so quickly and so extensively if it required state approvals for 
every state through which a proposed pipeline passed or additional state 
approvals for LNG terminals. For pipelines, that would require multiple 
approvals using multiple standards for “need” and review of economic and 
environmental impacts. For both pipelines and LNG terminals, a state forum 
 
 
 189. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 49, at 22–25 (discussing positions of various interest groups 
on expediting export decisions); Brenna Lee Wolcott, Note & Comment, Out With the Old and In With 
the New: Modernizing Liquefied Gas Regulations, 26 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 
REV. 139, 142 (2015) (arguing that DOE approval of exports to non-FTA nations has been 
“devastatingly slow” and that the process needs to be reformed). 
 190. See, e.g., Hannah Northey, Developers Face “New Reality” of Protests, Longer Reviews, 
GREENWIRE (June 3, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060038277 (discussing reports by the 
pipeline industry that “[t]he amount of time it takes companies to get a new gas project approved and 
operational—from the proposal phase to steel in the ground—has grown from three years to four” and 
that the delays are the result of both more projects being proposed and increased opposition to fossil fuel 
infrastructure). 
 191. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
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for approval would allow affected landowners, nonprofit groups, and others 
much easier access to decision-makers to oppose these projects, many of 
which have potential adverse environmental, land use, and aesthetic 
impacts. Moreover, in state proceedings, the focus as a result of politics as 
well as state jurisdictional concerns would be on the local need for natural 
gas and natural gas infrastructure rather than the federal focus on national 
and regional need. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated 
in a 2014 decision involving the siting provisions of the Natural Gas Act:  
Given the choice, almost no one would want natural gas 
infrastructure built on their block. “Build it elsewhere,” most would 
say. The sentiment is understandable. But given our nation’s 
increasing demand for natural gas (and other alternative energy 
sources), it is an inescapable fact that such facilities must be built 
somewhere. . . . Congress decided to vest the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission with responsibility for overseeing the 
construction and expansion of interstate natural gas facilities. And in 
carrying out that charge, sometimes the Commission is faced with 
tough judgment calls as to where those facilities can and should be 
sited.193  
One can certainly debate whether such rapid build-out of infrastructure for 
a fossil fuel resource is advisable, even if it has some significant benefits 
over other fossil fuel resources like coal. But it is clear that the federal 
process for siting and approving interstate natural gas pipelines and LNG 
terminals is a major reason, together with the economics driving private 
party investment in infrastructure, why that build-out has occurred so 
quickly. 
B. State Electric Transmission Line Siting and Eminent Domain Laws  
The siting, approval, and eminent domain processes for interstate electric 
transmission lines could not be more different from the process for interstate 
natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals (particularly post-2005) discussed 
in Part II.A. As stated earlier, electric transmission line companies must 
obtain approval to build new interstate electric transmission lines from 
regulators in all the states through which the line will pass.194 The Federal 
Power Act of 1935 grants FERC jurisdiction over “transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale 
 
 
 193. Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 194. See supra Parts I.C. and II.B. 
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in interstate commerce,”195 but states retain authority over the location and 
construction of both intrastate and interstate electric transmission lines. 
In most states the legislature has granted authority to its public utility 
commission (“PUC”) or equivalent state agency to review and approve 
intrastate and interstate electric transmission lines based on a variety of 
factors associated with showing a “need” for the line and the economics and 
environmental impacts associated with the line.196 If successful, the PUC 
grants a certificate of need or a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity that allows the transmission line operator to construct the line and 
exercise eminent domain to acquire the property necessary to build the line 
if the operator is unable to enter into voluntary easements with all 
landowners in the line’s path.197 For lines that cross several states, the 
operator must seek certificates in multiple states using multiple standards.198 
1. State Consideration of Regional Benefits and Local Costs of 
Transmission Lines 
The law differs from state to state as to whether state PUCs should 
approve interstate transmission lines that have significant regional benefits, 
such as moving wind or solar power from resource rich parts of the country 
to “load centers” (i.e. cities) several states away, or whether PUCs should 
only find a “need” for the line when there are also significant in-state 
benefits.199 Despite the uncertainties in state law, there have been several 
major projects in recent years that highlight the growing role of interstate 
transmission lines to provide regional reliability and renewable energy 
benefits. For instance, within the Midcontinent Independent System 
Operator (“MISO”) RTO,200 an area covering most or part of over ten states, 
public utilities and other industry stakeholders have worked with state 
regulators and regional planners to build a series of Multi-Value Project 
 
 
 195. Federal Power Act § 201(b); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 
S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
 196. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 122, at 149–50 (discussing state electric transmission line siting 
process). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See infra notes 214–228 and accompanying text; Klass & Rossi, supra note 122, at 151–55. 
 200. See supra note 71–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of RTOs and ISOs and their role 
in the U.S. electric grid. See also Electric Power Markets: Midcontinent (MISO), FERC, www.ferc.gov/ 
market-oversight/mkt-electric/midwest.asp#geo; MISO, 2014 Value Proposition: South Region (Feb. 
2015), https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/Workshops 
%20and%20Special%20Meetings/2015/Value%20Proposition/20150226%20Value%20Proposition%2
0Presentation.pdf. 
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(“MVP”) lines designed to improve grid reliability and transport wind 
energy throughout the region.201 These lines have taken over a decade to 
plan and construct, and have required approval by multiple state PUCs 
within the MISO region.202 In Texas, the state has worked with merchant 
transmission line companies and public utilities to build its $6.8 billion 
Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (“CREZ”) project over a 
decade. This project has constructed 3,600 miles of high-voltage 
transmission lines across Texas to integrate 16,000 MW of wind energy into 
the Texas grid.203 And a merchant transmission line company, Clean Line 
Energy Partners, is attempting to build five separate high-voltage DC 
transmission lines across multiple states in the Midwest and southeast to 
bring wind energy to population centers.204 
Unlike interstate natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals which can 
often be planned, permitted, and constructed within two or three years,205 
multi-state transmission lines can take well over a decade to plan, permit, 
and construct, if they can even receive approval at all.206 Texas is unique in 
 
 
 201. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 771–75 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing 
MISO’s MVP projects and upholding FERC’s approval of MISO’s regional cost allocation to pay for 
those lines); MISO, MULTI VALUE PROJECT PORTFOLIO RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 11 (2012), 
https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Study/Candidate%20MVP%20Analysis/MVP%20Po
rtfolio%20Analysis%20Full%20Report.pdf (discussing MVP planning process beginning in 2002); 
Multi Value Project Portfolio Analysis, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/Planning/Transmission 
ExpansionPlanning/Pages/MVPAnalysis.aspx [hereinafter MISO Project Portfolio Analysis] 
(describing projects); MISO Confirms Benefits of MVP Projects, MISO (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.miso 
energy.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/PressReleases/Pages/MISOConfirmsBenefitsofMVPProjects.aspx 
(discussing projects and how they benefit the MISO region). 
 202. See Minnesota-Iowa Transmission Line, CTR. FOR RURAL AFFAIRS, http://www.cfra.org/ 
clean-energy-transmission-map/line/minnesota-iowa (discussing the siting and permitting process for 
one of several MISO MVP transmission lines); MISO Project Portfolio Analysis, supra note 201 
(describing projects and eight-year planning process prior to permitting and construction). 
 203. See Daniel Cusick, New Power Lines Will Make Texas the World’s 5th-Largest Wind Power 
Producer, CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059995041; Matthew L. 
Wald, Wired for Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014 (reporting on completion of Texas CREZ projects); 
R. Ryan Stain, Note, CREZ II, Coming Soon to a Windy Texas Plain Near You?: Encouraging the Texas 
Renewable Energy Industry Through Transmission Investment, 93 TEX. L. REV. 521 (2014) (discussing 
the CREZ process). 
 204. See Klass, supra note 51, at 1927 (discussing Clean Line Energy Partners projects); Projects, 
CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com.  
 205. See PARFOMAK, supra note 68, at 7–8 (discussing average timeline for FERC approval of 
interstate natural gas pipelines). See also supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing how 
opposition to fossil fuel infrastructure projects has increased project timelines from three years to four 
years). 
 206. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 120, at 28–29 (discussing flaws in state siting process 
for interstate transmission lines); CHANG & PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 75, at 4 (discussing timeline for 
building transmission projects); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and 
Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 86–88 (2014) (discussing 
state barriers to interstate electric transmission lines); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of 
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that it has its own transmission grid,207 large cities, and ample wind 
resources all within a single state.208 As a result, a single planner and 
regulatory body can approve all aspects of the transmission line, and all the 
benefits and burdens of the line are borne within the state.209  
This is not the case for electric transmission lines in the rest of the 
country that must cross multiple state boundaries to bring renewable energy 
resources, particularly wind, to load centers. In that situation, the state that 
is exporting the wind sustains the benefits of selling its wind resources to 
the electric grid, creating economic gains for wind generators and related 
businesses in the state.210 Likewise, the state that is importing the wind is 
receiving a valuable energy resource that allows utilities in that state to 
provide carbon-free power to its customers, meet any state-imposed RPS, 
and in some cases lower electricity prices by increasing the electric energy 
resources in the state.211 But for a “pass-through” state that is in the path of 
the line but is not exporting or importing energy, its residents sustain the 
adverse impacts to property rights and environmental values associated with 
a large, high-voltage power line crossing the state with few of the 
benefits.212 Even for the importing or exporting states, residents impacted 
directly by the line and regulators in those states often argue that the costs 
 
 
Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 483–85 (2005) (discussing the 
growing shortage of transmission capacity and role of state law and NIMBY-based challenges in creating 
obstacles to modernizing and expanding the electric grid); Jim Snyder & Mark Drajem, Long Slog to 
Build Electric Power May Imperil Obama’s Carbon Cuts, 102 BNA DAILY ENVTL. REPORT, May 27, 
2015, at A-13; Alison Silverstein, Presentation at the NCEP Transmission Technology Workshop: 
Transmissions 101, at 51 (Apr. 20–21, 2011), http://www.naruc.org/grants/Documents/Silverstein%20 
NCEP%20T-101%200420111.pdf. 
 207. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”) manages the flow of electric power for 
75% of the land area in Texas and approximately 90% of the state’s electricity load. See Company 
Profile, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/about/profile. Texas is the only state with its own transmission 
grid. The rest of the continental United States is divided into two transmission grids—The Eastern 
Interconnection and the Western Interconnection. See Learn More About Interconnections, OFFICE OF 
ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-
and-implementation/ transmission-planning/recovery-act-0. 
 208. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1843–47 (2012) (discussing 
CREZ projects and uniqueness of Texas). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 122. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. See also ETO, supra note 95, at 24 (“The state-centric public-interest issue that arises most 
vividly for multi-state transmission projects involves the so-called ‘fly-over’ states. These states are 
situated between the states that are the starting and ending point for a long-distance transmission project. 
. . . The public-interest issue raised by states in the middle is that, at bottom, they are being asked to bear 
significant portions of the cost or adverse impact of a project, yet they do not believe they are being 
provided with sufficient opportunity to share in the benefits of the project.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
870 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:827 
 
 
 
 
 
associated with the line outweigh any benefits to the state associated with 
importing or exporting energy.213 
Thus, in every state other than Texas, which is unique for the reasons 
noted above, issues arise over whether the “need” for the transmission line 
should include multi-state, regional electric grid needs and whether such 
regional lines are a “public use” for purposes of exercising eminent domain. 
State regulators and state courts that have addressed this issue have often 
reached different conclusions. In each case, the question is how to weigh 
the costs and benefits of the line when the physical impacts fall on in-state 
residents and the benefits are diffusely felt throughout a multi-state region 
through increased grid reliability, renewable energy benefits, and, in some 
areas, lower electricity prices.  
Many state regulators have opposed new transmission lines that would 
serve regional electricity needs. For instance, in 2006, Southern California 
Edison sought to build a 230-mile high-voltage transmission line from 
California to a generating station in Arizona.214 California regulators 
approved the line but Arizona regulators rejected it, even though California 
ratepayers would have paid for the project.215 One regulator explained his 
vote by stating, “I don’t want Arizona to become an energy farm for 
California. This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air and 
our water to provide electricity to California.”216 Likewise, in Mississippi 
Power & Light Co. v. Conerly,217 the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1984 
refused to allow a utility to exercise eminent domain for a high-voltage 
power line between Mississippi and Louisiana because Mississippi 
customers would not directly benefit from the line and thus the line was not 
a “public use” for purposes of exercising eminent domain.218 A Florida court 
similarly held in 1967 in Clark v. Gulf Power Co.,219 that the state’s power 
of eminent domain could not be used to build a “one way transmission line” 
from Florida to Georgia for which Florida citizens “will not derive one iota 
 
 
 213. See infra notes 214–228 (discussing examples). 
 214. Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, Regulators Reject “Extension Cord for California” (May 
30, 2007), http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/administration/news/Devers_II_Vote.pdf; Order Granting a 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, So. Cal. Edison Co., Decision No. 07-01-040 (Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Jan. 25, 2007), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/FINAL_DECISION/ 64017.pdf. 
 215. Order Denying Certificate of Environmental Compatibility, So. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, 
Decision No. 69638 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, June 6, 2007), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/ 
0000073735.pdf. 
 216. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Press Release, supra note 214. 
 217. 460 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1984). 
 218. Id. at 113. 
 219. 198 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
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of benefit” despite “[c]onjecture” that the line would benefit residents of 
both states.220 
More recently, in 2014, Wisconsin regulators held hearings to determine 
the need for one of the MISO MVP lines discussed above. Among other 
things, the 345-kV line would provide transmission upgrades to western 
Wisconsin and provide local utilities with increased access to wholesale 
energy markets and increased renewable energy resources from the 
Dakotas.221 During the hearings, Wisconsin residents questioned “why 
Wisconsonites should have to give up their land and views so generators in 
the Dakotas can ship surplus energy to the East Coast.”222 Likewise, during 
the hearings in Missouri on the Clean Line Energy Partners “Grain Belt 
Express,” which would travel through four states, one resident stated “[i]f 
the East Coast wants wind power, let them produce it locally.”223 In July 
2015, Missouri regulators denied Clean Line’s request for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity for the Grain Belt Express project even while 
regulators in neighboring states had granted approval.224 In advance of the 
final decision, the Missouri commissioners opposed to the project stated, 
“the project wasn’t needed in the state and may not have an immediate 
benefit to Missouri ratepayers.”225 According to one commissioner, “[m]y 
first thought was that I need to look after Missourians first and go from 
there.”226 However, since rejecting the project, Missouri regulators 
indicated that they are willing to reconsider, particularly after the Missouri 
 
 
 220. Id. at 371. 
 221. News Release, Am. Transmission Co., PSC Deems Badger Coulee Transmission Line Project 
Application Complete (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.atcllc.com/whats-current/psc-deems-badger-coulee-
transmission-line-project-application-complete/.  
 222. Danielle Endvick, Farmers, Rural Landowners Opposing Transmission Project Say It Puts 
Their Lifestyle … On the Line, THE COUNTRY TODAY, June 18, 2014, at 3A.  
 223. Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line Transmission Project Gets Chilly Reception in Mo., ENERGYWIRE 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/08/13/stories/1060004417. 
 224. Jeffrey Tomich Clean Line Transmission Project in Limbo After Mo. Rejection, ENERGYWIRE 
(July 2, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060021203/ (reporting on Missouri PUC denial of 
certificate of convenience and necessity for Grain Belt Express); Order Denying Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity for Grain Belt Express, In re Application for Grain Belt Express Clean Line 
LLC, File No. EA-2014-0207 (Mo. PUC, July 1, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/07/ 
02/document_ew_03.pdf; Jacob Barker, Missouri Faces Hard Choice: Renewable Energy Highways, or 
Property Rights?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 14, 2015 (discussing positions of various Missouri 
PUC commissioners and status of Grain Belt Express in other states). 
 225. See Barker, supra note 224. See also AP, Missouri Farmers Continue to Fight Power Line 
Project Despite Illinois Approval, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 2015 (reporting that even though 
the Grain Belt Express had obtained approved in three of the four necessary states, Missouri regulators 
rejected the project, finding that it “wasn’t needed,” and noting “farmers’ concerns about crops, pastures 
and difficulties in maneuvering large equipment around towers.”). 
 226. See Barker, supra note 224. 
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Governor endorsed the project (citing evidence of benefits for Missouri 
residents) and several municipal utilities agreed to purchase long-term 
transmission services from the project if it is built.227 Nevertheless, the 
Grain Belt Express proceeding, along with the others described in this 
section, raise significant concerns that federal and state clean energy 
policies may be at risk as a result of the inability of interstate electric 
transmission lines to obtain state approvals for many years, if at all.228 
2. Implication of State Siting Authority for Interstate Electric 
Transmission Lines 
If a federal regulator, like FERC, issued approvals for interstate 
transmission lines, the local concerns over adverse impacts on property 
rights or environmental values could be evaluated against existing or future 
regional or national policies to promote an expanded electric grid to increase 
reliability and meet present and future federal and state clean energy goals. 
But state regulators are bound by state laws that may either expressly or 
impliedly direct them to consider predominantly in-state needs and in-state 
costs and benefits when issuing transmission line siting certificates. Many 
government and private sector experts warn that the nation’s aging electric 
grid must be expanded and modernized to avoid more frequent power 
outages, maintain adequate levels of grid reliability, and integrate the levels 
of renewable energy necessary to meet present and future state and federal 
clean energy mandates.229 These risks are exacerbated by the threats of 
climate change, which have already caused a rapid increase in weather-
related electric grid disruptions in the United States since 2000.230 Experts 
estimate that the industry must make investments in transmission and 
 
 
 227. See Jeffrey Tomich, Missouri Gov. Nixon Backs $2B Grain Belt Express Project, 
ENERGYWIRE (June 30, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039651. 
 228. See Snyder & Drajem, supra note 206; Krysti Shallenberger, Transmission Shortfall Tests 
Mont.’s Ability To Use and Sell More Wind, ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/ 
energywire/2015/03/18/stories/1060015223 (discussing inability of Montana to capitalize on its 
significant wind resources because of opposition to transmission lines by Montana and other state 
residents because of the impact of such lines on local property values); Krysti Shallenberger, Wind-and-
Gas Hybrid Power – Wyoming’s Idea of California Dreamin’, ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060013829 (discussing benefits of exporting wind power from 
Wyoming to California and other states to meet California RPS but that transmission constraints are a 
limiting factor). 
 229. Klass, supra note 51, at 1922–24 (citing and discussing reports). 
 230. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-74, CLIMATE CHANGE: ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE RISKS AND ADAPTATION EFFORTS 24–27 (2014); U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE U.S. ENERGY SECTOR: REGIONAL VULNERABILITIES AND RESILIENCE SOLUTIONS 
(2015) (discussing risks by geographic region). 
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distribution of nearly $900 billion and total investments in the system of 
$1.5 to $2 trillion dollars just to maintain current levels of grid reliability.231 
While FERC, other federal agencies, and regional entities, such as 
RTOs, have done their best to encourage greater consideration of regional 
benefits in transmission line siting, their statutory authority is very limited. 
Congress attempted to convey some siting authority to FERC in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, the same legislation that brought LNG siting authority 
under FERC’s jurisdiction. In reaction to the 2003 Northeast blackouts, 
Congress granted FERC “backstop” siting authority that would allow FERC 
to approve interstate transmission lines in areas of the country the DOE 
determined were subject to significant congestion.232 But court decisions 
limited that authority significantly, to the extent that any authority Congress 
may have attempted to convey has been rendered a nullity.233 Another 
provision of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 1222, grants the 
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) and the Southwestern Power 
Administration (SWPA)—two federal power administrations that sell and 
transmit hydroelectric power from federal facilities at wholesale to utilities 
within designated parts of central, southern, and western states—the 
authority to “design, develop, construct, operate, maintain, or own . . . an 
electric power transmission facility and related facilities . . . needed to 
upgrade existing transmission facilities” on their own or in conjunction with 
private transmission line operators.234 Although this provision may grant the 
federal government the authority to override state denials of siting permits 
and to exercise eminent domain authority, DOE, acting through SWPA, 
exercised this authority for the first time in 2016 when it granted an 
 
 
 231. MARC W. CHUPKA ET AL., EDISON FOUND., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INDUSTRY: 
THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030, at iv–xi (2008); cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 230 (discussing the necessity of large financial investments); U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, supra 
note 230 (same); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC 
GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 4 (2013) (same).  
 232. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 118, at 461–64 (discussing Section 1221 of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005); Klass, supra note 51, at 1918–19 (same). 
 233. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(invalidating DOE’s efforts to create a National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor (“NIETC”) for 
failure to adequately consult with affected states); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 
(4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1147 (2010) (holding FERC’s authority to exercise backstop 
siting authority not triggered when a state denies a siting permit but only when the state does not have 
authority to act in the first place or includes “project-killing” conditions on the permit); Klass, supra 
note 51, at 1918–20 (discussing court decisions and implications for federal electric transmission line 
siting authority). 
 234. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a). See also About WAPA, WESTERN AREA 
POWER ADMINISTRATION, https://www.wapa.gov/About/Pages/About.aspx; About the Agency, 
SOUTHWESTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION, http://www.swpa.gov/agency.aspx.  
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application by Clean Line Energy Partners—the merchant transmission line 
company discussed earlier—to partner with SWPA to build the Plains & 
Eastern Clean Line, a DC transmission line designed to bring wind energy 
from Texas and Oklahoma to Missouri, Arkansas, and other southern 
states.235  
In the absence of plenary federal authority over the siting of interstate 
transmission lines, state legislators, regulators, and courts routinely limit 
consideration of the costs and benefits of interstate electric transmission 
lines to those costs and benefits that fall on local residents.236 This is not 
surprising. State legislators and regulators must be responsive to their 
constituents, all of who are state residents and none of who are out-of-state 
residents. State legislators and regulators are also more likely to act in the 
interests of incumbent, in-state public utilities and not in the interests of out-
of-state merchant transmission line companies that may wish to compete 
with the utilities in transmission markets within the state.237  
State courts must also follow statutory directives, many of which make 
reference to “need” in the case of siting certificates and “public use” or 
“public purpose” in the case of eminent domain.238 Regulators and courts 
are likely to interpret those terms as referring to the need, public use, and 
public purpose of the state and its citizens, rather than a multi-state region.239 
In light of these impediments, in the case of a multi-state transmission line 
that may have limited benefits to residents of certain states through which it 
passes, it is not surprising that the planning and approval of an interstate 
electric transmission line is a process that routinely takes more than a decade 
to complete, if the line is approved at all. The patchwork system of state 
laws governing multi-state electric transmission lines makes it difficult to 
assess regional and national need and creates significant investment 
uncertainty for electricity transport infrastructure. 
 
 
 235. Plains & Eastern Clean Line Transmission Line, OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY 
RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-
and-implementation/transmission-planning/section-1222-0. Arkansas had denied a siting permit for the 
line on grounds that only public utilities that sold electricity at retail, and not merchant transmission 
lines, could seek siting permits. Affected states and landowners have challenged the legality of DOE’s 
approval. 
 236. See supra notes 210–228 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 122, at 211–17. 
 238. See Klass, supra note 51, at 1916–17; Klass & Rossi, supra note 122, at 149–50 (discussing 
state decisions). 
 239. Klass, supra note 51, at 1916–17. 
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III. FUTURE-PROOFING ENERGY TRANSPORT POLICIES TO PROMOTE 
ADAPTIVE INFRASTRUCTURE  
In order to meet current energy needs while also transitioning to a 
cleaner energy future, the nation needs laws that can facilitate the 
development of energy transport infrastructure to support both objectives. 
Even many CEOs of U.S. investor-owned utilities recognize the transition 
to a clean energy future is inevitable.240 Part III takes this transition as a 
given even if there remains significant debate over what that future will look 
like and how long it will take to get there. This Part first considers the energy 
transport laws discussed in Part II to distill three criteria that are important 
to consider in any evaluation of new energy transport laws or energy 
transport infrastructure. These criteria are then applied to two contemporary 
energy transport debates: (1) whether to shift some regulatory authority over 
siting interstate electric transmission lines from the states to the federal 
government or a regional entity and (2) whether to transport new sources of 
domestic oil by an expanded rail system or by new pipeline infrastructure.  
A. Criteria for Evaluating and Future-Proofing Energy Transport Laws 
and Infrastructure 
The analysis conducted in Part II provides support for the idea that laws 
that best serve both present and future energy transport needs are ones that: 
(1) match siting and permitting authority to the intrastate or interstate nature 
of the energy transport project; (2) allow for flexibility in the location and 
amount of expected energy resources to transport, import, or export; and (3) 
promote state and federal clean energy goals. To further evaluate these 
principles, this Section considers each in turn, drawing on the examples in 
Part II, and highlights situations where these criteria may be in conflict. 
1. Siting and Eminent Domain Authority that Matches the Physical 
Scope of Project 
The first criterion to consider in efforts to future-proof energy transport 
law is who should regulate the approval of energy transport infrastructure 
 
 
 240. See Rod Kuckro, Clean Power Plan is Obama’s ‘Legacy,’ Utility Leader Says, ENERGYWIRE 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060019969 (discussing public statements from leaders 
of the major utilities companies and the Edison Electric Institute that “it may be time to ‘call it a day’ 
and finalize a ‘rational’ rule” on GHG emission reductions from the power sector). 
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that spans multiple states and is designed to meet national or regional energy 
needs. As shown in Part II, states have a limited ability to prevent energy 
transport projects like interstate natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals 
where authority rests with FERC. Once Congress created federal siting 
authority for interstate natural gas pipelines in the 1930s, and for LNG 
import and export facilities in 2005, FERC was able to approve projects 
much more rapidly as the agency could consider national and regional 
energy needs and states could not easily veto such projects based on local 
concerns. 
This stands in stark contrast to energy transport projects like interstate 
electric transmission lines and oil pipelines where authority rests with the 
states. Part II shows that environmental advocates, landowners, and local 
politicians have been quite successful in delaying or completely halting 
interstate electric transmission lines, and, more recently, interstate oil 
pipelines,241 because regulators can more easily elevate state and local 
harms over national energy needs. In some cases, state statutes require 
regulators to consider solely in-state need or in-state public use for making 
permitting or eminent domain decisions. In other cases, state statutes are 
vague but provide regulators with the discretion to weigh local issues more 
heavily. While this may have the effect of preventing certain energy 
transport infrastructure projects that risk locking-in future fossil fuel use in 
the case of oil pipelines, it also prevents other projects like interstate electric 
transmission lines that can integrate more renewable energy in the grid.  
In sum, at a very basic level (and despite the many different ways to 
structure a siting process), federal regulation makes it easier to build multi-
state infrastructure projects. This is because it creates a single regulatory 
regime and decision-maker, as well as a standard for approval that considers 
national needs in addition to local needs, and makes local opposition more 
expensive and difficult. Such federal authority would seem to be optimal 
when the goal is to promote energy transport infrastructure that must cross 
several states and is needed to meet regional and national energy transport 
needs. Such federal authority would also appear to be unnecessary and in 
some cases suboptimal for in-state energy projects such as single-state wind 
farms, solar plants, or other generation facilities.242  
 
 
 241. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing increasing opposition to oil and 
NGL pipelines and growing refusal of some state regulators to issue siting permits or authorize eminent 
domain for such pipelines). 
 242. Notably, focusing the need for federal siting authority on whether the energy transport 
infrastructure is built within a single state or must cross multiple states would not support federal siting 
authority for LNG terminals, since those terminals are built only in a single state. Of course, Congress 
may always find other reasons, such as national energy needs, to justify federal siting authority for such 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
2017] FUTURE-PROOFING ENERGY TRANSPORT LAW 877 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Importantly, creating federal regulatory authority over interstate energy 
transport projects does not necessarily ensure that the most optimal or 
sustainable projects will be built. A federal process may facilitate an 
overexpansion of fossil fuel transport infrastructure by making it easier to 
build these projects. By contrast, a lengthier and less-efficient state process 
can delay or impose roadblocks to fossil fuel infrastructure projects, 
potentially facilitating a greater use of clean energy as a substitute or 
limiting new investments to smaller, less controversial projects.243 This is 
why the Sierra Club and other environmental groups have filed numerous 
lawsuits opposing every new LNG export terminal, arguing that the new 
terminals will lead to increased domestic natural gas production and 
increased GHG emissions associated with its use worldwide, at least as 
compared to renewable energy.244 But this effort’s lack of success, to date, 
merely highlights the fact that a federal process generally expedites the 
approval process for locally-controversial projects like LNG terminals 
designed to serve national energy needs, while a state process, like the one 
in place for interstate electric transmission lines, has the opposite effect. 
2. Flexibility Regarding Location and Amount of Energy Resources 
With regard to the second criterion—flexibility regarding the location 
and availability of domestic energy resources—the federal siting provisions 
governing LNG facilities and interstate natural gas pipelines are instructive. 
In 2005, the nation was concerned about diminishing supplies of domestic 
natural gas and the need to increase natural gas imports, which would 
require new and expanded LNG import terminals.245 In response to industry 
and FERC requests to create exclusive siting authority in FERC and to 
preempt most aspects of state regulatory authority, Congress created a 
streamlined federal siting process that applied to all LNG facilities, both 
import and export, and that severely minimized the ability of states to delay 
 
 
projects. See supra notes 162–167 and accompanying text. 
 243. See, e.g., Steve Huntoon, The Rise and Fall of Big Transmission, PUBLIC UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, 
Sept. 2015, at 32 (arguing that incremental transmission line expansion is generally preferable to many 
of the proposed “big” transmission projects [transmission lines greater than 500kV and at least 250 miles 
long] and that state laws and open stakeholder processes are a potentially good correction to slow down, 
modify, or kill many such projects). 
 244. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club campaign opposing 
LNG terminals to prevent increased global use of natural gas and associated adverse climate change and 
environmental effects from hydraulic fracturing activities and increased fossil fuel use). 
 245. See supra Part II.A. 
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or stop projects.246 In the late 2000s the industry used the LNG siting 
provisions to construct a number of LNG import terminals fairly quickly.247  
But once the industry began to implement hydraulic fracturing and 
directional drilling technologies on a widespread basis during those same 
years, all prior assumptions regarding the amount and location of U.S. 
natural gas production shifted dramatically. The industry and FERC were 
able to utilize those same federal LNG siting provisions to approve many 
new LNG export terminals and convert existing import terminals to export 
terminals.248 FERC was also able to approve major expansions of the U.S. 
interstate natural gas pipeline network to connect new natural gas resources 
in Pennsylvania, Texas, and other states to markets in less than ten years.249 
If Congress had created more limited siting authority that focused solely on 
LNG import terminals instead of covering both import and export terminals, 
it would have been much more difficult to respond so quickly to such major 
shifts in domestic natural gas production. Thus, the broad scope of the law 
created the flexibility to build energy transport infrastructure very rapidly 
to respond to significant changes in the amount and location of domestic 
natural gas resources. 
3. Promoting Clean Energy Policies 
The third criterion that should influence energy transport laws and 
infrastructure is whether they complement existing and emerging federal 
and state clean energy goals. EPA air pollution regulations, state RPSs, and 
numerous other federal and state laws discussed earlier attempt to decrease 
the use of fossil fuels, increase the use of renewable energy, and transition 
the nation to a cleaner and more sustainable energy future without 
significant energy price spikes or disruption. Such laws and policies should 
serve as a backdrop to any new policies, directives, and decisions that 
govern energy transport infrastructure. In other words, energy transport 
infrastructure should accommodate and facilitate future clean energy and 
sustainability goals. 
 
 
 246. See supra Part II.A. 
 247. See supra Part II.A. 
 248. See supra Part II.A. 
 249. See supra notes 56–58, 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing interstate natural gas 
pipeline expansions). 
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B. Applications: Future-Proofing Energy Transport Law and Energy 
Transport Infrastructure 
The previous section discussed various criteria for evaluating energy 
transport laws to meet current energy needs while also aiding the transition 
to a cleaner energy future. These criteria focused on placing regulatory 
authority at a level of government that can balance regional and national 
energy needs with state and local concerns based on the physical scope of 
the project, flexibility with regard to amount and location of energy 
resources, and promoting federal and state clean energy policies.  
This section first applies the evaluation criteria to the regulatory regime 
governing siting and eminent domain for interstate electric transmission 
lines. It concludes that these principles favor, on balance, a shift away from 
states possessing primary regulatory authority over siting interstate electric 
transmission lines and toward greater federal or regional authority. This 
section then focuses on one of the major energy transport debates of the 
current decade—whether to rely more heavily on expanding rail 
infrastructure to transport the massive new sources of domestic oil from 
production sites to refineries or expand the existing oil pipeline network. It 
concludes that using an expanded rail system instead of investing heavily in 
new oil pipelines is consistent with the criteria outlined above, utilizes the 
benefits of existing federal regulatory authority over railroads to quickly 
build such infrastructure, and avoids new, long-term investments devoted to 
continued reliance on fossil fuel resources. 
1. A New Regulatory Regime for Interstate Electric Transmission 
Lines?  
As discussed in Part II.C, states have primary jurisdiction over siting and 
eminent domain for interstate electric transmission lines on non-federal 
lands. At issue is whether this regulatory regime matches the appropriate 
level of regulator to the scale of the infrastructure, provides sufficient 
flexibility regarding the amount and location of energy resources, and 
promotes developing state and federal clean energy goals. 
With regard to which level of government can best balance national 
energy needs with local costs of infrastructure in evaluating interstate 
electric transmission lines that span multiple states, the criteria outlined 
above support federal or regional authority instead of state authority. As 
shown in Part II.B, local opponents to electric transmission lines are able to 
use state laws that focus narrowly on state need and state public use to defeat 
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or delay transmission line projects that would serve national and regional 
energy needs, including grid reliability and integration of more renewable 
energy resources.250 Federal and state mandates and goals to transition to 
low carbon electricity highlight the barriers state siting policies pose to a 
national clean energy policy. For instance, experts have concluded that one 
of the lowest-cost and most effective ways to reduce CO2 emissions from 
the electric power sector is to rely more heavily on an expanded footprint of 
renewable resources.251 But this is not possible without an expanded and 
enhanced regional transmission grid, which cannot be done in a cost-
effective and timely process without major changes to U.S. transmission 
line siting policy.252  
This stands in contrast to the federal system in place for interstate natural 
gas pipelines and LNG terminals that grants FERC authority to fully take 
into account national energy goals and needs in making permitting 
decisions.253 Indeed, the case for federal siting authority over interstate 
electric transmission lines is far stronger than it is for LNG import and 
export terminals, since such terminals are physically located in a single state 
and thus do not need approval from multiple state regulators. While there 
may be reasons to federalize the siting process for some intrastate energy 
facilities—and many were raised in the Congressional hearings in 2005 with 
regard to LNG terminals—the need is more acute in the case of interstate 
electric transmission lines where the physical infrastructure itself is 
interstate and serves national energy needs.  
The need for federal or regional authority for interstate electric 
transmission line siting is highlighted by the fact that states appear to do a 
fairly good job of weighing the costs and benefits of intrastate electric 
transmission line projects and approving many of them despite a variety of 
objections.254 For instance, in 2015, the New York PUC approved the 
construction of $1.2 billion in new, intrastate electric transmission lines 
 
 
 250. See supra notes 210–228 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., PATRICK LUCKOW ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., A SOLVED PROBLEM: 
EXISTING MEASURES PROVIDE LOW-COST WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION 6–9 (2015); Patrick 
Luckow & Tommy Vitolo, Renewables Integration and the Clean Power Plan (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Renewables-Integration-Webinar.pdf (webinar). 
 252. See Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of 
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1 (2016). 
 253. See supra Part II.A. 
 254. As noted earlier, when considering interstate electric transmission line projects, states often 
weigh the in-state benefits of the project far more heavily than the regional or national benefits, and deny 
projects that are not perceived as providing in-state benefits. See supra notes 210–228 and accompanying 
text. See also ETO, supra note 95, at 23 (“When a project is wholly contained within a single state, the 
range and coordination of issues that must be considered is comparatively straighforward.”). 
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aimed at easing electricity prices and cutting GHG emissions in the state by 
allowing for the transport of more wind energy in the northern part of the 
state to the southern part of the state.255 The proposal was consistent with 
Governor Cuomo’s “Energy Highway” initiative designed to “cut 
downstate power costs, offset retirements of aging plants, . . . and increase 
the potential for renewable energy, including wind, to supply New York 
City.”256 Also in 2015, the Texas PUC approved a new $600 million electric 
transmission line project, the Houston Import Project, designed to bring 
power from northern Texas to the Houston area.257 Both the New York 
project and the Texas project are expected to be in service by 2018 or 
2019.258 These projects are in stark contrast to the Clean Line Energy 
Partners projects and other projects discussed in Part II, which have been 
mired in controversy and litigation for many years. The Texas and New 
York projects also differ from the Northern Pass transmission line and other 
lines designed to bring Quebec hydropower to cities in the northeast United 
States, which have been subject to long-term disputes.259 Opposition to 
these interstate lines stems not only from landowner and environmental 
group concern over the physical impacts of the lines, but also from fear that 
significant imports of Canadian hydropower will diminish investment in 
and markets for in-state renewable energy development.260 
As for flexibility regarding the location and amount of energy resources, 
a regulatory regime that facilitates long-distance transmission line 
development is optimal. As discussed in Part I, the United States has a new 
abundance of low-cost wind and solar energy capacity in parts of the 
Midwest, Plains states, and Southwest that are not well-served by existing 
 
 
 255. Jim Polson, New York Backs New Transmission Lines to Ease Power Prices, 243 BNA DAILY 
ENVTL. REPORT, Dec. 18, 2015, at A-13. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Edward Klump, Major Texas Transmission Project Gets Green Light, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 18, 
2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060029727. 
 258. Polson, supra note 255; Klump, supra note 257. 
 259. Erin Ailworth, Transmission Projects Aim to Tap Canadian Hydroelectricity, BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 20, 2014 (describing concerns that transmission lines will allow Canadian hydropower to flood 
New England electricity markets to the detriment of local renewable energy); Rik Stevens, Can New 
England Plug in to Growing Canadian Hydropower?, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 3, 2015 (“Aside 
from the question of routes, critics worry that a vast supply of power from Canada will lull states into a 
false sense of security and that they’ll let efficiency efforts lapse or shirk requirements to find more 
renewable sources closer to home.”). See also Hoecker & Smith, supra note 206, at 86–88 (describing 
interstate electric transmission line projects where state PUCs denied approval because the line would 
not provide power to in-state residents). 
 260. Ailworth, supra note 259; Stevens, supra note 259. 
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long-distance transmission lines.261 More importantly, unlike oil or natural 
gas pipelines, which are devoted to a single energy resource, interstate 
transmission lines transport electrons that are created by coal, natural gas, 
hydropower, and other renewable electricity resources interchangeably. As 
a result, transmission lines that are built today to transport existing coal-
fired electricity and low-cost natural gas-fired electricity can, if they are 
properly located, also be used to connect new wind farms and solar plants 
to the grid and can be upgraded as new battery technologies and other forms 
of energy storage are developed.262  
One might argue that electric transmission lines themselves are 
significant sunk costs that may be rendered obsolete by rapid developments 
in battery technology and other forms of energy storage on the distribution 
side of the grid, illustrating a lack of flexibility. In other words, why not just 
focus on demand-side technologies, develop cost-effective micro-grids, and 
reduce dependence on the traditional interstate electric transmission grid 
(i.e., the “macro-grid”)?263 While such a future scenario cannot be 
discounted entirely, energy storage technologies appear to be developing in 
a way that both enhance the ability of the macro-grid and allow businesses 
and homes to create more resilient micro-grids. More importantly, very 
different sectors of the electricity market are simultaneously expanding the 
reach of renewable energy on both types of grids, with large investor-owned 
utilities adding large amounts of wind energy to regional grids in some parts 
of the country and companies like SolarCity and Tesla Motors creating new 
opportunities for micro-grids.264 During this time of transition, hindering 
interstate grid expansion risks losing important momentum in the growth of 
renewable energy, particularly large-scale wind energy, where costs have 
decreased sufficiently to undercut both coal and natural gas on price in many 
parts of the country.265 Rejecting legal reform that would facilitate regional 
 
 
 261. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 262. See, e.g., How the Electricity Grid Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/how-electricity-grid-works#.V-MRILUW8uA (last revised Feb. 
18, 2015). 
 263. CHRISTOPHER VILLARREAL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, MICROGRIDS: A 
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE 4–9 (2014) (defining micro-grids and macro-grids and describing benefits 
of improvements to both types of grids and potential ways the two types of grids can support each other). 
 264. See supra notes 76–90, 111–119 and accompanying text (discussing developments in utility-
scale wind power and distribution-side solar PV resources). See also BRUCE TSUCHIDA ET AL., THE 
BRATTLE GROUP, COMPARATIVE GENERATION COSTS OF UTILITY-SCALE AND RESIDENTIAL-SCALE PV 
IN XCEL ENERGY COLORADO’S SERVICE AREA (2015) (study showing greater cost-effectiveness of 
developing utility-scale PV solar as opposed to distributed, or micro-grid, solar). 
 265. See, e.g., Katie Fehrenbacher, Wind Now Competes with Fossil Fuels. Solar Almost Does, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/06/wind-cheap-coal-gas/; LAZARD, LAZARD’S 
LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 10.0 (Dec. 2016), https://www.lazard.com/media/ 
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grid expansion also reduces the opportunities for technological 
developments to create valuable synergies between macro-grids and micro-
grids.266 These include allowing grid operators to rely on EVs and other 
energy storage devices in homes and businesses at times of peak grid 
demand, while re-charging those same distribution side resources when grid 
congestion as well as the price of electricity are low.267 In sum, there are 
real economic, environmental, and distributional concerns associated with 
abandoning the macro-grid completely in favor of micro-grids.268 
As for promoting state and federal clean energy policies, experts are 
already worried that significant reductions in CO2 emissions from the 
electric power sector will be very difficult without the long distance 
transmission lines required to integrate more utility-scale wind and solar 
energy into the grid.269 State barriers to interstate electric transmission lines 
also make it difficult for utilities in certain states to meet RPS mandates if 
in-state sources of renewable energy are limited. Thus, a federal or regional 
regulator that can take into account regional and national clean energy 
policies is preferable. 
A transfer of siting and eminent domain authority to a federal or regional 
regulator is also consistent with the “matching principle” within federalism 
theory, particularly as applied to environmental and energy law, which 
focuses on which level of government (generally state v. federal) is best 
suited to address a particular issue.270 It is important to stress that many of 
 
 
438038/levelized-cost-of-energy-v100.pdf. See also THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ENERGY 
INSTITUTE, NEW U.S. POWER COSTS: BY COUNTY, WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 1-3 (2016) 
(finding that the Levelized Cost of Electricity (“LCOE”) – “the estimated amount of money that it takes 
for a particular electricity generation plant to produce a kWh of electricity over its expected lifetime” – 
which varies based on local conditions and resources shows that “natural gas combined cycle power 
plants are the lowest cost option for at least a third of US counties” and that wind is also found to be the 
lowest cost option in many counties). 
 266. CHANG & PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 75, at 11–12 (discussing continuing need for long-
distance electric transmission expansion even in a future with significantly greater reliance on distributed 
energy resources). 
 267. See VILLARREAL ET AL., supra note 263, at 9–11 (discussing how expansion of micro-grids 
can support macro-grid operations and efficiencies, provide additional resilience in times of macro-grid 
outages from storms or other electric disruptions, and effectively manage intermittency of micro-grid 
and macro-grid renewable energy resources by coordinating storage and demand with generator output). 
 268. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 7, at 1626 (“[E]ven though grid defection may become an 
increasingly attractive option for some, it is not optimal from either an economic or an environmental 
perspective and it has potentially serious distributional consequences.”).  
 269. See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text (discussing grid expansion needs). 
 270. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: 
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 
(1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 648 (1996) 
(“Problems that are by-and-large local in scope (waste site cleanups, drinking water quality, and 
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the federalism principles that would favor retaining strong state authority in 
a variety of areas of environmental and energy law do not apply to interstate 
electric transmission lines. In most areas of environmental and energy law, 
there are good arguments in favor of retaining strong state authority in 
connection with meeting both state and federal energy and environmental 
policy goals. For instance, there are robust arguments in favor of allowing 
states to experiment with regard to RPSs, phasing out the use of coal, 
restrictions on hydraulic fracturing, whether to build new nuclear facilities, 
and how stringently to set clean air, water, and soil standards beyond federal 
minimum standards. In each case, a state can, if it chooses, work 
independently in its own “laboratory of democracy” and develop policies 
that other states, and perhaps the federal government, can ultimately 
adopt.271  
Interstate electric transmission lines are different. Outside of Texas, 
which has its own electric grid, interstate electric transmission lines form a 
network of regional, multi-state electric grids designed to meet regional 
energy needs.272 Even if a state wishes to increase its own use of clean 
energy through an expanded transmission grid to, for instance, import more 
wind or solar from neighboring states, it cannot do so without the consent 
of adjacent states. By contrast, an energy generation facility like a coal plant 
or a wind farm may be large and may be controversial, but is almost always 
within a single state boundary and thus does not require the cooperation of 
at least two states. Moreover, a state energy policy or, in fact, any state 
policy, may have spillover effects in neighboring states but does not require 
the threat or use of eminent domain to take physical property in other states. 
This need for the use of land across a state’s borders often prompts intense, 
 
 
spending on playgrounds, for example) should be regulated at the local level. Problems that arise on a 
regional scale (controlling pollution in a river system or an airshed, for example) should be managed on 
an ecosystem basis across states or even countries when necessary. To the extent that an environmental 
problem, such as acid rain, spans a great number of states, a national regulatory structure may be 
required.”); Gregg P. Macey, Boundary Work in Environmental Law, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 103, 105–16 
(2015) (discussing “matching principle” arguments in environmental law); Felix Mormann, Clean 
Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1672–74 (2015) (describing classic federalism theory and 
the matching principle as applied to various issues in energy law); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. 
Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 807 (2013) (discussing “scale matching” 
in federalism debates). 
 271. Klass & Wilson, supra note 208, at 1830–31 (discussing application of Justice Brandeis’s 
famous quote that “a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” (quoting New State Ice 
v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 272. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 208, at 1831. 
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local opposition to the project in a neighboring state, pressuring regulators 
in that state to reject the project.273  
Thus, interstate electric transmission lines are in a fairly small category 
of multi-state physical infrastructure projects that necessarily require the 
cooperation of at least two states and physically require land in multiple 
states. Such projects face unique roadblocks not easily remedied by state 
law. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the expansion of regional 
electric grids creates positive network externalities with broadly dispersed 
benefits (in the form of increased grid reliability, lower overall grid-related 
costs, and greater flexibility and availability of energy resources) without 
easily quantifiable and immediately tangible local benefits.274 Similar 
roadblocks caused Congress to transfer siting authority over interstate 
natural gas pipelines from the states to the federal government in the 1930s, 
and prompted Congress to assign federal authority over the interstate 
highway system from the outset in the 1950s. Interstate electric transmission 
lines also differ in important ways from interstate oil pipelines, which are 
also subject to state siting authority. In the case of oil, there are multiple 
methods of domestic, interstate transport—tanker, pipeline, and rail. Thus, 
state roadblocks to siting interstate oil pipelines can arguably be overcome 
by switching to a different form of transport, like rail, that is not subject to 
state control.275 In this way, modern-day interstate electricity transport is 
much more similar to interstate natural gas transport than it is to interstate 
oil transport, even if that may not have been the case in the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, there are costs to any transfer of authority for interstate 
electric transmission line siting from the states to a federal or regional 
permitting authority. The local costs of a project in the form of impacts on 
 
 
 273. See supra notes 210–228 and accompanying text (discussing local opposition to interstate 
transmission lines). 
 274. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“However theoretically attractive may be the principle of 
‘beneficiary pays,’ an unbending devotion to this rule in every instance can only . . . discourage 
construction [of long-distance, high voltage transmission lines] while the nation suffers from inadequate 
and unreliable transmission. Unsurprisingly, it is not possible to realistically determine for each utility 
and with reference to each major project . . . the precise value of not having to cover the costs of power 
failures and of not paying costs associated with congestion, and all of this over the next forty to fifty 
years.”). 
 275. The only time there has been federal siting authority for oil pipelines in the United States was 
during World War II, when German bombers cut off oil shipping routes from Texas to northeastern 
states. At that time, Congress created federal siting authority for oil pipelines to address the refusal of 
several states to approve oil pipelines to transport oil to Northeastern cities, and several key oil pipelines 
were built. However, federal authority lasted only until the end of the war, when siting authority was 
transferred back to the states. See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 30, at 962–63.  
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private property and aesthetic values are not unimportant, and a state 
regulator will certainly be more responsive to the local communities 
impacted by the proposed project. The threat of a state permit denial may 
cause a transmission line company to re-route the line, re-think the project 
entirely, or come up with a less costly or more modest project with more 
limited environmental and land use impacts.276 This is particularly true for 
public utility transmission lines projects (as opposed to merchant projects), 
because the public utility is incentivized to build large infrastructure 
projects to obtain a rate of return on those investments from ratepayers.277 
Moreover, delays in electric transmission line projects may give time for 
new technologies, like large scale batteries and other forms of energy 
storage to reduce or eliminate the need for certain projects in the first place.  
Despite these arguments that favor state primacy over interstate electric 
transmission line siting, a federal or regional approach appears to be a better 
solution based on the arguments set out above. On balance, a regulatory 
structure that gives states primary authority over interstate electric 
transmission lines does not appear to meet the criteria developed earlier to 
future-proof energy transport laws and energy transport infrastructure. 
While not every “big” transmission project should ultimately be built, there 
are benefits to building at least some of them, in order to determine the full 
extent to which more significant amounts of renewable energy, particularly 
utility-scale wind, can transform the electric grid. To date, state law has 
made such projects costly and difficult in many parts of the country.  
Thus, it is not surprising that scholars have argued in recent years that 
regulatory authority over interstate electric transmission lines should shift 
from the states to FERC; to a regional entity that could more fully take into 
account national and regional electric energy needs; or to a group of states 
through interstate compacts.278 Another option is the path Congress used in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to address local government 
 
 
 276. See Huntoon, supra note 243 (discussing how state regulatory scrutiny can result in more 
modest and more appropriate transmission line projects). 
 277. Id.; Rebecca Smith, Utilities’ Profit Recipe: Spend More, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2015; Werntz, 
supra note 95 (discussing differences between merchant transmission line companies and public 
utilities); Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework, N.Y. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, Case 14-M-0101 (May 19, 2016), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.asp 
x?DocRefId=%7BD6EC8F0B-6141-4A82-A857-B79CF0A71BF0%7D (adopting new revenue model 
for New York utilities and discussing limitations of traditional ratepayer recovery model that rewards 
investment in capital intensive infrastructure projects and replacing it with a revenue model based on 
performance metrics). For a discussion of utility ratemaking, see KLASS & WISEMAN, supra note 208, 
at ch. 6. 
 278. See Klass, supra note 51 (discussing potential for federal or regional siting authority for 
interstate electric transmission lines); id. at n.1 (collecting citations to scholarship arguing for increased 
federal authority over siting of intestate electric transmission lines). 
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roadblocks to siting cell phone towers.279 In that law, Congress retained 
siting authority with local governments but created new, federal standards 
for processing applications, prohibited outright bans on cell phone towers, 
set deadlines for local government decisions, and created an expedited right 
of review in federal court.280  
There are also concerns over whether existing state laws violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause by elevating state interests over interstate 
movement of electric energy resources.281 Creating more federal authority 
or regional authority over interstate electric transmission line siting would 
help address these issues. Indeed if merchant transmission line companies 
or others parties adversely affected by state permitting processes begin to 
bring successful dormant Commerce Clause challenges in these cases, 
Congress may be compelled to address this issue, as it did in 1935 with the 
enactment of Part II of the Federal Power Act, after the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the dormant Commerce Clause prevented states from regulating 
interstate electricity sales.282 
2. Transporting Oil by Rail vs. Pipeline 
The prior illustration focused primarily on who should regulate the only 
currently available means of energy transport for electricity—interstate 
electric transmission lines—to best future proof the electricity sector. This 
second illustration focuses not on who should regulate but, instead, how to 
choose between two options for transporting crude oil—today’s dominant 
energy resource in the transportation sector. As explained in Part I, although 
interstate pipelines have been the primary form of oil transport for decades, 
 
 
 279. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012). 
 280. For a discussion of the cell phone tower siting provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 and their potential application to electric transmission line siting as well as renewable energy 
generation facilities, see Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 293 (2011); Klass, supra note 51, at 1951–52; Klass & Wilson, supra note 208, 
at 1865–66. 
 281. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 122 (discussing dormant Commerce Clause concerns with 
existing state transmission siting laws). 
 282. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (holding 
that Rhode Island could not regulate electricity sales from a utility in Rhode Island to a customer in 
Massachusetts without violating the dormant Commerce Clause); Federal Power Act §§ 201–06 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824e) (addressing the “Attleboro gap” and granting the Federal Power 
Commission—now FERC—authority to regulate the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce 
and wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 U.S. 
760, 767 (2016) (discussing Congress’s enactment of the Federal Power Act in 1935 to respond to the 
Attleboro gap). 
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there has been a growing reliance on rail to transport oil from the Bakken 
shale region in North Dakota and other new production areas to refineries.283 
Thus, the question here is whether the future proofing criteria identified 
above favors relying more heavily on an expanded rail system to 
supplement existing pipelines for new U.S. oil transport needs or whether 
these criteria support additional pipeline expansion. 
With regard to the ability to balance regional and national energy 
transport needs against the local costs of energy transport infrastructure, 
existing laws governing railways already promote national, interstate 
transportation interests over more localized concerns. The U.S. Department 
of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board (“STB”)284 has broad 
jurisdiction over “transportation by rail carriers” as well as the construction 
and operation of tracks and facilities under the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”).285 The Federal Railroad 
Administration (“FRA”) is responsible for railroad safety.286 The ICCTA 
also includes an express preemption clause, which courts have interpreted 
as displacing state and local regulation that would “manage,” “govern,” or 
interfere with rail transportation but does not necessarily displace state or 
local public health and safety laws of general applicability that have only an 
incidental impact on rail transportation, such as local electric, building, fire, 
and plumbing codes.287  
This stands in stark contrast to the regulatory regime governing interstate 
oil pipelines, which allows states to promote state and local needs over 
 
 
 283. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 284. See About, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, www.stb.dot.gov/stb/about/overview.html.  
 285. Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting 49 U.S.C. 
§ 10501(b)(1)); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 157 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing 
enactment of ICCTA and creation and jurisdiction of the STB); 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1).  
 286. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., FED. R.R. ADMIN., https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0002. See also 
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, supra note 284 (discussing history of ICC and STB); 49 U.S.C. § 
10102(9); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 608 F.3d at 157 (explaining that “transportation” by rail carriers is 
defined broadly in ICCTA as including any facility or services relating to movement of passengers or 
property by rail). 
 287. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b); Norfolk Southern Ry Co., 608 F.3d at 157–58, 160 (discussing scope 
of ICCTA preemption clause); Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 
2005) (state and local governments may regulate certain areas affecting railroad activities such as local 
electric, building, fire, and plumbing codes); Borough of Riverdale Petition for Declaratory Order, 4 
S.T.B. 380, 389, 1999 WL 715272 (S.T.B., Sept. 9, 1999) (local governments can enforce in non-
discriminatory manner electrical and building codes and can take action to address genuine emergencies 
on railroad properties). See also Jim Anderson, Railroad Steams Ahead with St. Paul Rail Yard 
Expansion, STAR TRIB., Sept. 19, 2014 (discussing inability of City of St. Paul to impose environmental 
review or permitting requirements on Canadian Pacific Railway in connection with controversial 
switching yard expansion in wetland and wildlife area after Canadian Pacific sought a preemption 
determination from the STB). 
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national energy needs. While not all states have stringent permitting 
requirements for oil pipelines,288 growing opposition to oil pipelines in 
many regions of the country, as a result of the controversy over Keystone 
XL and Dakota Access, coupled with new alliances between climate change 
activists and landowners, are making oil pipelines more difficult to permit 
and construct. Moreover, state agencies and courts are becoming more 
receptive to such arguments.289 This is in large part because concerns about 
state and local environmental and landowner costs are more easily able to 
dominate the state regulatory process.290 One can argue quite persuasively 
that the federal regime governing railroads places too much weight on 
national transportation needs and too little weight on state and local health 
and safety concerns.291 But to the extent new infrastructure is necessary to 
transport oil across the country, it makes approving new railroad lines far 
easier than approving new pipelines, at least in some states, thus meeting 
current energy needs. 
As for flexibility regarding the amount and location of energy resources, 
rail would appear to be superior to pipelines to transport oil. As discussed 
in Part I, rail is established infrastructure that already serves every oil 
refinery in the country, and using it to transport oil requires only the 
construction of new loading and unloading facilities and some track 
expansion, which can be approved more quickly than pipelines, thus 
allowing greater flexibility, increased response time to market fluctuations, 
and fewer capital risks.292 This is why some producers favor transporting oil 
 
 
 288. For a discussion of the permitting requirements for oil pipelines in all 50 states, see Klass & 
Meinhardt, supra note 30, at 982–89 and app. A. 
 289. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing growing opposition to oil pipelines 
and decisions by state PUCs and courts to reject proposed pipelines or limit eminent domain rights in 
part because adverse impacts on state residents exceed state benefits regardless of national benefits); 
Sawyer, supra note 36 (discussing protests for Sandpiper oil pipeline and diversity of participants). 
 290. See, e.g., Iowa Landowners Cry Foul Over Eminent Domain Claim, ENERGYWIRE (July 29, 
2015), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060022550/feed (reporting on lawsuit questioning 
Iowa PUC’s authority to grant eminent domain authority to interstate oil pipeline company on grounds 
that “[o]ut-of-state companies shouldn’t be allowed to use Iowa law to take farmland from Iowans and 
install a hazardous pipeline and then not be subject to our laws about safety.”); Jenny Mandel, 
Protesters’ Win “a Wakeup Call” for Other Pipeline Projects, ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2016/12/06/stories/1060046715 (quoting oil pipeline company 
public affairs expert stating that it is easier “‘to deal with an agency like FERC, and your senator and 
your congressman, and to get support that way,’ than it is to go to 50 different towns along your pipeline 
route holding open houses and coffee gatherings, only to be met by state officials worried about the level 
of local opposition they're experiencing.”).  
 291. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 287 (discussing inability of City of St. Paul, Minnesota to apply 
its environmental protection provisions to railroad expansion project). 
 292. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See also QER, supra note 4, at 5-5 (discussing 
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by rail over pipeline in some parts of the country despite the fact that it costs 
$5-10 more per barrel for rail transport.293 Indeed, the railroad industry spent 
$575 billion on rail network expansion and maintenance between 1980 and 
2014, and will likely continue to invest in expansion of rail facilities in light 
of an expected 45% overall increase in freight shipments from an estimated 
19.7 billion tons in 2012 to 28.5 billion tons in 2040.294  
More important, the benefits of any expansion or upgrades to existing 
rail infrastructure to transport oil are not limited to fossil fuel resources. 
Railroads are used to transport a variety of agricultural commodities, other 
freight, and of course people. As a result, investments in rail infrastructure 
can be valuable to the economy as a whole, not just to the oil industry.295 
Finally, even beyond the flexibility that comes with the ability to transport 
a variety of commodities and passengers, rail infrastructure has an 
impressive history of being able to convert to entirely new uses, as shown 
by the federal Rails to Trails program, which has converted over 20,000 
miles of unused rail lines to bicycle and walking trails.296 By contrast, 
billions of dollars of investments in new oil pipelines benefit the oil industry 
in the short term but create capital-intensive infrastructure that cannot easily 
be converted to other purposes. This is a major limitation, particularly if the 
nation ultimately is able to reduce reliance on oil in the transportation sector 
and transition to more efficient gasoline vehicles, EVs, or whatever new 
technologies may be developed in the future.297 
 
 
flexibility of rail for oil transport as compared to pipelines); Russell Hubbard, Union Pacific Aims to Be 
First Railroad to Haul Liquefied Natural Gas, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 19, 2015 (“[T]he fact is 
that railroads are the best bet to get significant amounts of natural gas to market given the decades it 
takes to permit and construct pipelines.”); ALLIANCE FOR INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, BACK 
ON TRACK: BRINGING RAIL SAFETY TO THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 3–4 (2015) (discussing limitations of U.S. 
pipeline system to transport new sources of shale oil, difficulty of building new pipelines because of 
local opposition, and why the rail system is a more flexible and extensive transportation network for 
transporting new sources of oil if safety measures can be implemented). 
 293. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text; Tracy Johnson, Pipelines vs. Trains: Which is 
Better for Moving Oil?, CBC NEWS (Mar. 10 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/pipelines-vs-
trains-which-is-better-for-moving-oil-1.2988407. 
 294. ASS’N OF AMERICAN R.RS., RAILROADS AND COAL 10 (2015). 
 295. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing inability of existing rail system to 
accommodate growth in oil transport without adverse impacts on grain and passenger rail transport).  
 296. See, e.g., History of RTC and the Rail-Trail Movement, RAILS TO TRAILS CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.railstotrails.org/about/history/; Jason Keyser, AP, Abandoned Chicago Railway Reborn as 
Commuter Corridor, SALON (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/08/23/abandoned_chicago_ 
railway_reborn_as_commuter_corridor/. 
 297. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text (noting concerns that investment in new oil and 
gas pipeline infrastructure will create a path dependency that will lock in continued reliance on fossil 
fuels for decades); Andrew Leach, Is Canada Headed for a Pipeline Bubble?, MACLEAN’S, May 27, 
2014 (questioning whether Canada needs new pipeline expansion if it intends to abide by its international 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions, which would require limiting oil sands development). But see 
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With regard to promoting state and federal clean energy goals, building 
new oil pipelines locks in continued reliance on fossil fuels for decades and 
thus is not consistent with policies encouraging a transition away from such 
energy sources. By contrast, an expanded rail system would facilitate 
continued short-term use of fossil fuels by transporting oil to refineries 
without precluding the use of that infrastructure expansion at a later date for 
other purposes unrelated to fossil fuel transport. Thus, this crierion also 
supports greater use of rail for transporting oil not served by existing oil 
pipeline infrastructure. 
However, in the context of rail versus pipelines for oil transportation, 
there are also important questions regarding which form of oil transport 
better protects overall human health, safety, and the environment. These 
questions are at least equal in importance, if not more important, than the 
criteria already discussed in considering the benefits and drawbacks of rail 
and pipelines for oil transport. On this issue, the evidence appears to be 
mixed. Although there have been several recent oil-by-rail disasters 
resulting in death and destruction of property, there have also been several 
recent major oil pipeline spills that have had significant adverse effects on 
human health and the environment.298 Pipeline supporters contend that 
accidents happen more frequently on railways,299 while rail supporters 
counter that when pipelines fail, they spill many more gallons of oil.300 
According to government statistics, both claims are accurate.301 Data also 
 
 
KUB, supra note 45 (contending that building new pipelines to accommodate oil transport is better for 
the grain industry than railroad expansion but recognizing that rail expansion can also help alleviate 
current bottlenecks). 
 298. See, e.g., PAUL F. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41536, KEEPING AMERICA’S 
PIPELINES SAFE AND SECURE: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/ 
R41536.pdf (detailing several high-profile pipelines spills); FRITTELLI ET AL., supra note 40, at 10–14 
(discussing recent oil pipeline spills and oil train derailments); PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44201, DOT’S FEDERAL PIPELINE SAFETY PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS (2016) (discussing data on pipeline spills and federal laws and regulations governing pipeline 
safety). 
 299. See, e.g., KENNETH P. GREEN & TAYLOR JACKSON, FRASER RESEARCH BULLETIN, SAFETY IN 
THE TRANSPORTATION OF OIL AND GAS: PIPELINES OR RAIL? (2015) (using U.S. and Canadian data to 
conclude that oil transport by pipeline is safer than rail). But see Blake Sobczak, Pipelines Safer than 
Rail for Moving Oil—Study, ENERGYWIRE, Aug. 14, 2015 (discussing data limitations of Fraser Institute 
study). 
 300. ALLIANCE FOR INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 292 (discussing benefits of 
shipping oil by rail, the strong safety record for rail, and ability to improve rail safety for oil transport 
through new regulations and best practices). 
 301. See, e.g., Emily Atkins, Data: Oil Trains Spill More Often But Pipelines Spill Bigger, CLIMATE 
PROGRESS, Feb. 18, 2015 (reporting on higher accident rate for rail but larger volume spills for pipelines 
and concluding that “both rail and pipelines pose serious risks to human health, and instead of forcing 
people to choose between two dangerous options, we should focus on improving the safety of both 
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suggests that while rail accidents cause more harm to human health and 
property, pipeline spills cause more harm to natural resources and 
ecosystems.302 Moreover, many oil spills that cause significant 
environmental harm go undetected because they are underground, while rail 
accidents are very visible, encouraging public and legislative demands for 
additional safety measures. According to the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), existing pipeline leak 
detection systems have only detected 5% of pipelines spills over the past 
decade, and it often takes time for sensors to let operators know to shut off 
delivery when a problem exists.303 For instance, in 2010, it took seventeen 
hours to detect the release from the Enbridge oil pipeline into the 
Kalamazoo River near Marshall, Michigan, which released nearly 850,000 
gallons of Canadian oil sands, covering thirty-six miles of riverbed and 
resulting in significant harm to aquatic ecosystems and over $1 billion in 
remediation costs.304 Experts at the International Energy Agency evaluated 
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data on both pipeline spills and rail spills in recent years and agreed that 
although rail accidents were more frequent, pipeline spills were often more 
serious and also were underreported.305 These facts suggest that the health 
and environmental risks associated with pipelines may be understated as 
compared to rail accidents, which are immediately visible to regulators and 
the public and subject to immediate emergency response. 
In light of the safety-related shortfalls of both means of transporting oil, 
an equally relevant question may be whether new regulations governing rail 
or pipeline safety can significantly improve the safety record of either form 
of oil transport. Significantly, because very little oil had been shipped by 
rail before the fracking boom in the late 2000s, there was little need for 
developing new rules for tank cars, tracks, and other safety measures for the 
industry relating specifically to the transportation of oil.306 By contrast, 
pipelines have been the dominant method for transporting oil in the United 
States for many decades, meaning that any lag in safety improvements can 
be more easily attributed to inadequate government regulation, industry 
compliance failures, inadequate enforcement failure, or a combination of 
these factors.  
A review of new safety proposals for both methods of oil transport also 
reveals mixed results, although there appears to be more potential for 
relative safety increases for rail than for pipelines in the near future. With 
regard to pipelines, Congress enacted a major pipeline safety bill in 2011, 
The Pipeline Safety Act, following the Kalamazoo River oil spill that, 
among other things, increased the maximum civil fine for safety violations, 
required DOT to develop new safety rules for oil and gas pipelines including 
requiring automatic shut-off valves on new pipelines and new release 
reporting requirements, and directed DOT to prepare reports to Congress on 
a variety of pipeline safety issues.307 But in July 2015, members of the U.S. 
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House Energy and Commerce subcommittee questioned the PHMSA 
Interim Director at a hearing as to why the agency had not yet implemented 
most of the rules and reports mandated under the 2011 legislation.308 
Although the agency released a set of proposed safety rules in October 
2015,309 the rules were still not final at the end of 2016 and, even when final, 
industry compliance and DOT enforcement will remain an issue.310 Many 
pipeline spills have occurred when industry has not followed current safety 
standards. For instance, Plains Pipeline, the company responsible for the 
May 2015 Santa Barbara oil spill that released over 100,000 gallons of oil 
near a state beach as a result of significant corrosion in the pipeline, had 
accumulated 175 safety and maintenance violations since 2006, resulting in 
over $115,000 in civil penalties, releasing more than 688,000 gallons of oil, 
and causing $23 million in property damage, prior to its most recent spill.311  
As for rail safety, an analysis of freight train derailments from 2001 to 
2010 found that broken rails or track welds were the leading cause of 
derailments with 665 derailments; track geometry defects were the next 
leading problem with 317 derailments; and other track, train car, and 
operator errors made up the remainder.312 Despite these statistics, most of 
the regulatory activity on improving oil-by-rail safety has been on rail car 
design to prevent accidents and mitigate damages in the case of an accident. 
In May 2015, the PHMSA and FRA jointly issued a final rule for “Enhanced 
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Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for High-Hazard Flammable 
Trains,” which included requirements for enhanced braking, increased 
thickness and thermal protections for tank shells in high-hazard flammable 
train cars, reduced operating speeds, rail routing risk assessments, and rail 
routing information access.313 The rules required tank cars built prior to 
2011, which have the fewest safety features, to be replaced by 2018, while 
newer tank cars must be retrofitted or replaced by 2020.314 The railroad 
industry opposed the rules as too restrictive and unnecessary while safety 
advocates as well as members of Congress from high rail traffic areas 
argued the rules did not provide sufficient protections for the increased 
transport of oil by rail.315 Others contended that the rules were a step in the 
right direction but could be more effective if they focused more heavily on 
assessing and improving track integrity and providing more automatic 
safety backups to reduce the risk of human error, since track-related 
problems are the highest cause of derailments in the first place.316 
Just a few months later, in December 2015, Congress enacted the “Fixing 
America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015” or “FAST Act.”317 The 
FAST Act was the first multi-year federal transportation bill in over a 
decade, and included provisions governing the safe transport by rail of 
energy products such as oil and other and hazardous materials.318 The statute 
required a commodity-specific phase out of pre-2011 tank cars and created 
statutory mandates for thermal blankets, top fitting protections on tank cars, 
and provisions to harmonize the tank retrofit schedule with the schedule 
Transport Canada has set for its tank cars.319 The FAST Act schedule for 
tank car upgrades accelerated the upgrade schedule for unrefined petroleum 
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products and relaxed it for certain other products, although the number and 
types of cars required for upgrade and retrofit did not change.320 In August 
2016, the PHMSA issued new regulations to harmonize its earlier 
regulations with the requirements of the FAST Act.321 
In sum, there is clearly room for improving safety associated with 
transporting oil by both pipeline and by rail. The federal agencies 
responsible for regulating the safety of both forms of oil transport are in the 
process of enacting new rules and safeguards. There is perhaps more reason 
to be cautiously optimistic regarding the ability of regulators to improve rail 
safety more quickly than pipeline safety. Pipelines continue to suffer 
significant spills, delays in rulemaking, and compliance problems despite 
having served as the dominant form of oil transport for many decades. 
Pipelines themselves are not visible to the public, regulators, or operators, 
and the ability to respond to problems and keep the issue salient with 
Congress, regulators, and the public is hampered by this lack of visibility, 
making regulatory improvements more difficult. Rail regulators, by 
contrast, have responded relatively quickly with new rules after industry 
began transporting increased amounts of oil by rail and are also subject to 
new Congressional mandates. The public, activists, members of Congress 
and state officials are able to visibly monitor oil by rail transport activities 
on a daily basis, which results in additional pressure on Congress and 
federal agencies to impose new safety regulations and encourage 
compliance. Only time will tell if new rail safety standards will continue to 
be imposed and whether those standards have a real impact on oil-by-rail 
accidents. But the benefits of transporting oil by rail discussed earlier in this 
section coupled with the mixed data on the relative safety of transporting oil 
by pipeline as opposed to rail appear to favor a greater reliance on rail in the 
short term to transport oil. Rail expansion would avoid significant 
investment in new pipeline infrastructure that can only be used for fossil 
fuels. It would also focus investment in infrastructure that could be used 
later to transport a wide variety of commodities and passengers if the nation 
is ultimately successful in reducing domestic oil demand. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article considers the important decisions the United States must 
make now regarding how to shape the expansion of energy transport 
infrastructure. The nation is faced with a new abundance of low cost fossil 
fuel and renewable energy resources at a scale not contemplated by industry 
experts as recently as ten years ago. Although, for the most part, it is the 
private sector that will make the investment decisions on whether to expand 
energy transport infrastructure and where that expansion will take place, 
legal structures governing siting permits and eminent domain authority 
necessary for some forms of expansion will influence those decisions 
greatly. This Article illustrates why choices made now on energy transport 
infrastructure will heavily impact whether the nation continues to rely 
significantly on fossil fuel resources for decades to come or can aid the 
transition to low-cost and no-carbon sources of renewable energy for 
electricity generation and in the transportation sector. This Article also 
suggests that in order to best future-proof energy transport infrastructure, it 
is important to create regulatory frameworks that: (1) grant federal or 
regional authority for approving energy transport infrastructure that 
physically spans multiple states; (2) do not lock-in assumptions regarding 
the location and amount of expected energy resources to transport, import, 
or export; and (3) support current and future federal and state clean energy 
policies. With these criteria in mind, policymakers and industry can better 
use energy transport laws and energy transport infrastructure to meet 
today’s energy needs and at the same time integrate the rapid technological 
and economic changes in the U.S. energy landscape. 
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